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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

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## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### Treatment of Afghan War Veterans Criticized

93LA0044A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
10 May 93 p 9

[Article by Fahmi Huwaydi: "It Is More Appropriate That We, Rather Than France, Employ Afghan Arabs"]

[Text] As in the case in which the West benefits from the Arab braindrain, the same thing is recurring in the case we are about to discuss. However, the surprise here is greater and more bitter because what is utilized in this case are faithful jihad capabilities from which the Arab and Islamic world has failed to benefit.

One is depressed and saddened when one reads in the morning press that a number of "radicals" arriving from Afghanistan have been arrested at an Arab airport and that when inspected, some of them were found to carry a number of books and cassette tapes!

Not very many months ago, these people were mojahedin celebrated everywhere. News of their steadfastness and of their victories, which unsettled the Soviet Union and contributed to shaking its bases until it ended in what we see today, were circulated by the world media.

Whenever we visited Pakistan on any occasion, the invitation to visit Peshawar and to meet the Arab mojahedin and relief workers there was added automatically to the visit itinerary so Arab and Muslim researchers would be given the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the bright pages recorded by their brothers who had responded to the call to jihad and who had abandoned their worldly goods and gone seeking martyrdom for God.

The wind and the rhetoric have changed, and the word "Afghan" has come to be coupled with radicalism and terrorism. What is more, the mojahedin have turned into suspects and defendants and their jihad journey has become evidence proving the charge against them, justifying the inclusion of their names in airport blacklists, arresting them upon arrival, and confiscating the belongings they carry with them, even if these belongings are books and cassette tapes.

I have said on numerous occasions that we make a grave mistake if we generalize the accusation to include everybody and that all should not be punished for the offense of the few, if it is proven that the few have committed acts punishable by the law. This generalization may settle some current political accounts but the arrows it has been shooting in rapid succession undermine the value of jihad itself. If we consider every mojahedin a suspect and a defendant and if this belief spreads among people, then who would respond to the call to jihad in the future if our nation is confronted with a circumstance that demands alerting and mobilizing the youth to defend faith, land, or honor? This entire threat is not an imaginary assumption but rather an existing

possibility, and the Bosnia is a "crown witness" to the likelihood of its materialization.

I have also said that we do not have the luxury to waste thousands of young men who, as soon as they found a noble goal that merits the sacrifice of life, rushed from every direction, vying for martyrdom. Some have won martyrdom and some still yearn for it.

I have often wondered: Isn't there a way to employ the religious and jihad capabilities of these young men to serve one of our nation's noble goals? Is it reasonable that while having thousands of young men who are willing to die, we cannot benefit from them and we fail to find a single cause that merits their sacrificing their lives in its defense?

Israel is a readily available example of a place where religious radicalism has its visible presence and where it truly causes the government a great degree of annoyance. But the political system mechanism has not committed the prohibited act of clashing with the radical organizations the way this act has been committed in some of our Arab countries. Rather, radicalism in Israel has been employed to serve the interest of the Israeli settlement plan. These politically-annoying factions have become the Israeli regime's instrument for occupying Arab lands and homes, for the attempt to burn down al-Aqsa Mosque, for building settlements, for terrorizing Arabs, and for other activities that revolve in the sphere of realizing the Zionist dream. Thus, radicalism has been transformed from a danger threatening the regime into an evil means used by the regime to implement its scheme.

On Thursday, 29 April 1993, AL-MUSLIMUN published a frontpage report on the "Afghan Arabs" in which it renewed the call for considering ways to employ their capabilities in the interest of the Arab nation which is in the direst need of their jihad in various fields.

However, on the following morning (30 April), I was surprised with a frontpage report in Kuwait's AL-QABAS entitled: "A French Islamic Rapid Deployment Corps." The report, dispatched by the paper's London reporter, said that France is planning to establish an Islamic equivalent of the Foreign Legion, which is considered one of the best-known French military units. The unit planned to be formed will consist of Muslim soldiers entirely, mostly Arab Afghans from Algeria and other North African countries, but also including Egyptians, Libyans, Lebanese, and Gulf citizens as well.

According to the report, contracts have been concluded with 200 such individuals who have been selected carefully to make sure of their psychological and physical fitness. These people are being trained currently at the Foreign Legion camps in Calvi, the Island of Corsica.

This plan's objective is to use these troops for military intervention when the need arises in the Islamic world.

In addition to containing these Muslims and keeping them from joining radical North African groups, the French believe that their creation of this Islamic corps will make the Islamic countries welcome them.

At the same time, the French seek to enhance their influence in the Islamic countries, especially those countries that have become a main market for their arms production. The recruitment of Muslims is an advantage that makes the Islamic countries prefer to enlist the help of this Islamic corps to enlisting the help of non-Muslim forces, such as the British or U.S. forces.

The lessons of the Somalia experience and the Kuwait liberation war have helped crystallize this idea among the French who have been considering it for years.

To be specific, incidents caused by French troops in Somalia as a result of behavioral practices that are unacceptable in Islamic societies amounted to 50 incidents in two months. In one of those incidents, a Somali young woman was killed because she had developed relations with some of those troops.

The report noted that these Afghan Arabs have emigrated in considerable numbers to Germany and France and that the French effort to utilize them has aroused the anger of some Arab leaders, one of whom discussed this issue with European leaders last month. Even the U.S. and French intelligence agencies have discussed this matter. The French have responded by saying that attracting the "Afghans" to the division that is planned to be created is better than having them take part in provoking unrest in their countries, as evidenced by the fact that those among them who returned to Algeria have joined the FIS. The French have also said that the discipline characterizing the Foreign Legion will keep these people far from terrorist activities.

To me, the report was an exciting surprise that was not void of bitterness. Whereas I had hoped on that day that Arab and Islamic countries would utilize these Afghan Arab young men, I was surprised on the following day to find out that the utilization idea had materialized but that the beneficiary was the French, not the Arabs. If the published report, which contained interesting details that spelled out the number of those contracted and their training place, is true, then it means that the experience gained by the Arab mojahedin is about to be utilized in the interest of the French plan and ambition, not in the interest of the Arab nation which produced and nurtured these mojahedin. What is happening to Arab intellectuals—who are cultivated, raised, and trained in the Arab world but who are ultimately imported by Western countries and the United States in particular and who end up employing their capabilities to enhance and advance these countries—is also happening in the case we are discussing. However, the difference here is greater and more bitter because what is exploited in this case is not Arab intellectuals but religious and jihad capabilities which the Arab and Islamic world have been unable to utilize.

The Arab and Islamic world has renounced and persecuted these capabilities which could find no safe haven except in joining Foreign Legion camps in the Island of Corsica.

This is a desperate option, no doubt about it. I do not know the type of mojahedin who have accepted it or the logic that persuade them to accept it. But I imagine that the sad fate awaiting those mojahedin who are in their countries has encouraged these ones to avoid it in any way possible, and perhaps at any price. When these mojahedin read that arrest orders await them at Arab airports, perhaps it occurs to the mind of some among them who are frustrated and desperate that anything else is more merciful and more endurable.

I have no doubt but that some of them have reiterated the words of Prophet Joseph, peace be upon him, who said: "O my Lord, the prison is more to my liking than that to which they invite me" [Koran: 12:33]. But I say that wrath and condemnation shouldn't go to those who have agreed to join the French division but should be directed primarily at our Arab and Islamic conditions that have failed to absorb them and that have treated them as suspects and criminals.

One can hardly believe that our inability and poor assessment would reach this amazing extent. By the same token, one is most surprised when one sees our Islamic and Arab world suffer the problems of occupation, backwardness, misery, and missionary activities that we all know, and all of which offer broad fields for jihad. Yet, it does not occur to us to utilize these young men's capabilities in these fields. We even go further, accusing, trying, and soiling the reputation and image of these men so as to drive people away from the course of jihad and from the mojahedin!

Is this reasonable?

### UMA Journalists Create Union

93AF0563A Algiers *LIBERTE* in French 18 Apr 93 p 3

[Article by S.T./APS: "Toward the Creation of an Observation Post To Defend the Rights of the Journalist"]

[Text] *The introduction of democracy requires the encouragement of freedom of expression and free access by journalists to the sources of information.*

Meeting in conjunction with the conference on the development of trade unionism in the Maghreb that was held recently in Tunis, the concerned professional organizations have decided to create the League of Journalists of the Arab Maghreb Union [UMA].

This League—first of its kind in the UMA—invites the public and the governments of the Maghreb countries to safeguard, steadfastly and rigorously, the freedoms that constitute proof of the existence of a democratic society.



It was therefore obvious to the journalists that the coherent development of Maghreb society will be impossible without a free press through the medium of which the peoples of the UMA can express themselves without any hindrance.

The activity of this new organization is basically intended to improve the professional, moral, and material situation of journalists and to strengthen solidarity among professionals at the local, regional, and international levels.

The founding members of the League have emphasized that this new organization is independent of any political party, economic organization, or other group.

During a press conference held last Tuesday at the headquarters of the Association of Tunisian Journalists, the speakers emphasized their desire to help make freedom of expression a living reality in the Maghreb by devoting their efforts primarily to defending the journalist's right to carry out his mission with honor and dignity, and by scrupulously obeying the rules of ethics and professional deontology.

In this connection, the League decided to make every effort to create a monitoring post to defend the rights of journalists. The headquarters of the monitoring post will be in Algiers.

The administrative structure of the League of Journalists of the Arab Maghreb consists of three organs: the presidential council, the general secretariat, and the executive bureau. In consideration of the political differences that divide the five UMA countries, the League intends to work on its own—and with complete independence—to bring about democracy.

## ALGERIA

### Order Prohibits Wearing Islamic Attire

93P50187A Paris LE MONDE in French 19 May 93  
p 4

[Excerpt] From now on the wearing of Islamic attire is forbidden in government offices and public firms under penalty of punishment or dismissal, according to a ministerial order published Monday, May 17, in local newspapers. The order, described as a "special ruling," stipulates "the banning of all attire, personal effects, symbols, or garbs that openly express adherence to an ideological, political, or religious movement." This order targets primarily the "qamis," the long white Islamic robe, and the bushy beards that the followers of the former Islamic Salvation Front regularly wear, as well as the attire of the Afghan rebels, imported by Muslim extremists. It is unknown if this order applies to women wearing the veil, or the "hijab." [Passage omitted]

### Agreement Signed With Spain To Build Ferry Ship

LD0405211693 Algiers ENTV Television Network  
in Arabic 1900 GMT 4 May 93

[Excerpt] Algeria and Spain signed an agreement today at the Djenane El-Mithak conference hall. The agreement concerns the construction of a passenger ship with ultramodern technology. Wasilah Filali attended the signing ceremony:

[Filali] An agreement was signed today between the Algerian marine transport national enterprise and the Spanish marine federation for the construction of a passenger ship. The ship will be built in Spain. The value of the project is \$111 million, equivalent to 267 billion centimes. The ship, which will be able to carry 1,300 passengers and 500 cars at a speed of 21 knots, will serve the Algerian community abroad.

This contract has several advantageous features with regard to credit and repayment. First, it is a government credit, in that the Spanish Government is providing 50 percent of the loan with a repayment period of 30 years and a 10-year grace period at a rate of interest of 1.25 percent, while the rest is a commercial loan with a repayment period of 8.5 years at a rate of interest of 8 percent.

The ship is expected to be completed toward the end of 1993 and will be delivered by the end of 1995. [passage omitted]

### Benbitour Explains Government Financial Policy

93AF0572B Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French  
26 Apr 93 pp 1,3

[Article by Mourad Metahri: "Algeria Is Solvent"—first paragraph is ALGER REPUBLICAIN introduction]

[Text] Between 1989 and 1992, Algeria disbursed 35 billion dollars to service its debt. That figure represents 26 billion in repayment of principal and 9 billion in interest payments. During that same four-year period, Algeria raised only 25 billion in new credits, resulting in a net outflow of 10 billion dollars. Payment arrears (800 million dollars in February 1992) have been settled and exchange reserves now "exceed 1 billion dollars." According to the most recent official figures dated October 1992, exchange reserves stood at 1.6 billion dollars. In 1993, Algeria will have to disburse more than 9 billion dollars in debt service, 7.2 billion of it in repayment of principal.

Mr. Benbitour, the minister delegate to the Treasury, explained the government's financial policy to the Algerian press yesterday, over a hearty breakfast.

On the subject of external accounts, the minister delegate gave an overview of the history of Algeria's external debt and the problems of debt service. The first shock came in 1986, according to the minister delegate, when export

revenues fell by 4.3 billion dollars and imports slowed by only 1 billion dollars. The effect of that shock has been prolonged by rising debt service payments, which went from 6 billion dollars in 1986 to 9.1 billion in 1991.

Thus, in four years, Algeria repaid 26 billion dollars in principal and 9 billion dollars in interest. During that same period, Mr. Benbitour noted, only 25 billion dollars in new credits were received, resulting in a net outflow of 10 billion dollars.

According to the minister delegate, the necessary steps to balancing the external accounts are: curtailing costs inflated by "sweeteners" (this problem has been solved, Mr. Benbitour believes); increasing net reserves; preventing the debt service from expanding (by limiting recourse to short-term debt); and effecting a change of attitude toward our partners by drawing attention to the importance of net outflow (10 billion dollars in four years). Necessary to this policy as "safety mechanisms," Mr. Benbitour believes, are the free exchange of currency and the injection of private capital into public enterprises; for the latter, a special institution should be created.

In remarks on the balance of payments, Mr. Benbitour stated that a trade surplus of 3.5 billion dollars was posted at the end of 1992. In nonfactor services (transportation, insurance, travel, etc.), a deficit of 1.4 billion dollars was posted. According to the minister delegate, Algeria does not have a solvency problem. The country has a current account surplus of 1.3 billion dollars.

The second part of the minister's presentation dealt with internal accounts. The subject of the budget deficit dominated his remarks, which evolved into something of a short—and interesting—course on classical, neoclassical, Keynesian, and other schools of economics. To disprove the existence of a causal link between the budget deficit and monetary growth, Mr. Benbitour noted that in 1986, when Algeria posted its first major deficit, monetary growth was a mere 1.8 percent; in 1991, when the country had a budget surplus, monetary growth shot up to 21 percent. In Mr. Benbitour's view, the projected 1993 deficit of 163 billion dinars may prove less inflationary than other options. He highlighted the need to reright the financial situation of state-run companies. "The IMF is now convinced that the rerighting of state-run companies is not inflationary," he noted.

#### **Progress Report on 'Algeria 2005' Commission**

93AF0572C Algiers *EL WATAN* in French  
26 Apr 93 p 24

[Text] On 15 February 1993, the president of the Higher State Council, Ali Kafi, established a commission of academics, managers, and high-ranking civil servants to study how Algerian society will evolve over the next decade.

The "Algeria 2005" commission immediately set to work under the coordination of Professor Djilali Liabes, general manager of the INESG [expansion not given] who was slain

by terrorists on 13 March 1993. Although deeply distressed by his tragic death, the members of the seven working groups were later able to resume their task.

They are now about to complete the first phase of their study and seven reports have been written, covering the following subjects:

- a) population and society
- b) environment and land use
- c) education, culture, and research
- d) sector strategies and economic logic
- e) political and institutional evolution
- f) the policy of sovereignty and national defense
- g) international environment.

At this point in the study, it can be stated that major challenges await our country and that tackling those challenges will require a great deal of determination, imagination, and courage.

Social demand will grow at a fast pace; financial resources will be limited; and certain sectors of the economy—agriculture, in particular—will be hampered by limiting factors that will be difficult to overcome.

Only two things can help us to meet those new challenges: improvement in our levels of production and enhancement of our ability to compete.

There is no need to add that structural policies must be developed as quickly as possible, because the economic troubles we are experiencing are structural as well.

In all areas, reforms must be undertaken immediately to prepare our economy and our society for the third millennium.

There is no doubt that the work of this nonpartisan expert committee will help the decisionmakers to tailor their programs more closely and that it will encourage Algerians to persevere in the struggle for the country's development.

#### **Increased Pressure To Neutralize 'Terrorists'**

93AF0572A Algiers *LIBERTE* in French 27 Apr 93 p 2

[Article by Mounir Zeroual: "New Antiterrorist Tactics; 15,000 Soldiers Called In"]

[Text] Army units totaling 15,000 troops will be called in to assist the security forces already on the front lines in the battle against terrorism. This marks a heightening of the effort against the scourge.

The sight of military convoys has not gone unnoticed by the residents of Algiers and especially its suburbs, accustomed in recent months to the sound of automatic gunfire interrupting the stillness of the night. Trucks

carrying troops and materiel and light tanks painted in military colors have been seen on the roadways. While the city's usual appearance of calm remains unaffected, its citizens are anxious. But there is no need to panic: This is not a military takeover. It is precisely the opposite that is happening.

The Algerian Army, which has the distinction of being the first army in the world to take to the streets to fight for democracy, is once again in demand, this time to assist the security forces in the battle against terrorism. A communique issued last Thursday by the National Gendarmerie set the tone of this new phase in the battle, aimed at "cleaning out" the terrorist underworld in specific districts. The districts of Baraki, Cherarba, and Eucalyptus had been carefully scoured by the security forces, resulting in numerous arrests.

The communique stated that this will be "a joint effort by the gendarmerie, the army, and the police in the wilayat that make up the Center region and wherever else terrorist activity is taking place." It also noted that in conjunction with the operation, new antiterrorist methods are being adopted to step up pressure on terrorist groups and neutralize them.

The choice of the notorious Baraki and Eucalyptus districts as the starting points for this operation is indicative of the role these districts play in subversive activity. It was in the Eucalyptus district that the most deadly individual attacks were perpetrated. It was here that the president of a municipal executive delegation was slain last August and it was here that the first woman to be the direct target of a terrorist act was killed. Clearly, the perpetrators of these deeds had many sources of support in these districts.

The new phase, involving invaluable assistance from the Army, had been expected ever since the Higher State Council reaffirmed that the antiterrorist struggle is a "major national priority."

According to sources quoted by the AFP, three divisions made up of some 15,000 men will be deployed in the Algiers region. Their command posts will be located in the southern, eastern, and western sectors of Algiers, thereby surrounding the city.

The Army units are to lend their assistance to the security forces already at work to flush out the followers of subversion. Their role will be to keep the districts under control so that units of the police and gendarmerie can conduct a systematic sweep of them, according to the same sources quoted by the AFP.

It therefore seems clear that the forces of law and order never allowed themselves to be overwhelmed; they took the time to adapt to a situation they had been unprepared to handle, and are now responding in a methodical, multiphased manner.

### Weapons in Circulation: Acquisition Discussed

93AF0562D Algiers L'HEBDO LIBERE in French  
14-20 Apr 93 p 4

[Article by K. Ben: "Channels and Caltrops"; words within slantlines published in English]

[Text] When, several months ago, Ali Haroun—responding to questions from the weekly LA CROIX—declared that almost all of the weapons in the possession of the fundamentalist terrorists had been recovered, people were entitled to say that they were somewhat skeptical. The dismantling of an impressive nationwide arms traffic network, the discovery of a large number of semiautomatic guns (Perfecta, Beretta) in the possession of the terrorists, and the recent display to the press of a collection of nine submachine guns (four Uzis and five Scorpions) have just punched holes in Haroun's lofty optimism and thereby intensified our concerns. To unleash and carry on its war, the destructive fundamentalist machine was not satisfied with just the weapons stolen from the martyrs who fell in the defense of the Republic. It has in fact been confirmed that the Chebouts and their associates have continued to increase their fire power, and although we are—of course—very far from the "200 tanks and three MIG's" attributed to the MIA [Armed Islamist Movement] by the fundamentalist man in the street, it is no less true—to quote the words of the most recent communique of the National Gendarmerie—that we should "determine the number of weapons...that are in circulation in Algeria, and the manner in which they were introduced into the country."

There are those who have ignored these basic questions and have had eyes only for the nationality of the weapons seized most recently. Some might contend, however, that they are looking with only one eye, because they overlook the "Scorpions" (manufactured in Yugoslavia under license from Czech patent holders) and have preferred to see only the "Israeli" weapons.... The ancestral enemy has been identified and recognized: Israel!

A reminder: During the insurrectionary strike carried out by the former FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] in June 1991, the Islamist militants were shouting accusations of a "secular-Zionist" plot while brandishing the shells of tear-gas grenades used by the security services (it did not matter that the grenades came from deep in the heart of Pennsylvania; the militants were insisting that they were...Israeli army grenades).

Spanning the glaring paradox in one leap, analysts with dazzling lucidity in April 1993 are seeing the emergence of an "Islamist-Zionist" plot.... Except for its dramatic context, the whole thing might be laughable.... There is no lack of serious trails to follow, however, and when the security forces allude to involvement by "external forces," one cannot help but look simultaneously in the direction of Iran, Morocco, Libya, and France.

### The Forgotten Statements of H. Abderrahim

The statements of the butcher at the airport were soon forgotten: "That was the state of things when I was arrested." "That" occurred at the moment a document from Cheboudi was demanded in order to expedite a shipment of weapons from Libya, which would then have moved through the cities of southern Algeria via relays that constituted a network to take it to the Center, the East, and the West. The transaction concerned a shipment of Kalashnikov rifles. Although the fundamentalist terrorists—in view of the failure of their underground movement—have today opted for a type of weapon more suitable for urban terrorism, there is nothing to indicate that they have changed suppliers.... It is known that the Algerian fundamentalists are in contact with the RIL (Libyan Islamic Resistance), but it is not likely—if you consider the repression directed against them—that they are in a position to supply "military assistance" of any kind. The recent visit of General Omar El Bachir to Tripoli—and the ensuing statements relating to the application of Islamic law—lead one to believe that the most recent whim of the bizarre Libyan colonel has been to endorse the kamiss [type of clothing]. From there it is only a short step to the assumption that material aid is going to the fanatical partisans of the MIA from someone who only a little while ago was hurling direct insults at Algeria (thanks to HHC [expansion not given]). It is a proposition that is in fact no longer an educated guess but a working hypothesis.

This hypothesis had hardly been formulated, however, when we were forced to turn our attention again to our western flank.

As we know, the country of our neighboring "laboratory assistant" [laborantin]—by virtue of accords concluded with the regime of the mullahs—is being used as a country of transit for the "Afghans." Moreover, insistent reports from Western underground sources also tell of participation by the Moroccan secret services in the attack on HCE [Higher State Council] member Khaled Nezzar. In the absence of incontestable proof, however, there are a number of logical presumptions. As for the permeability of the national borders, a simple detour to your neighborhood /dealer/ will be instructive.... The shipments of *chite* from the mountain ranges of the Rif region are continuing, despite the state of emergency and the multiplicity of road barriers as far as La Montagne and indeed elsewhere. One cannot help believing that the weapons are taking the same route.

Is it superfluous to mention the possibility of Iranian involvement? Undoubtedly. We need only recall that since the so-called Irangate affair the mullahs (foster fathers of the terrorist beast) have had a big stock of Uzis—without serial numbers—for shipment to their progeny. We should note the coincidence between the closing of the embassy and the sudden appearance of the first Uzis...a sample shipment, perhaps? And because we are talking about coincidences, here is another one just as troubling: "The fundamentalists get their weapons in Paris." In addition to this eye-catching headline in the magazine USD, there was the famous

"Report of the French Minister of the Interior to the Office of the President of the Republic"—a report in which one could read, among other things: "Some of these Islamist elements—who constitute the hard core of this group—recently tried to obtain military weapons, namely Uzi PM's [semiautomatic weapons] and Scorpio (Czech) PM's. This transaction, initiated by Lamri Debaa, was probably implemented partially...." Let us point out that this group—still according to the report—is "without any possible doubt linked to the FIS movement in France."

A "partially" implemented transaction involving Uzi and Scorpio PM's? Here we have a new trail to follow, and once again we can see the shadow of the French secret services, at least up to the period preceding the most recent legislative elections. We will have to wait and see whether the new parliamentary majority will succeed—despite Mitterrand—in interdicting the Islamist activists, who have made France one of their rear bases for continuing their activities. It is obvious that even if the terrain has been cleared beforehand, it will not be easy for the various security services to determine the origin of the weapons and the manner in which they have been introduced into the country.

It is even more difficult to attempt to determine the number of weapons involved. The official figures report 175 "armed" terrorists; does that mean there are fewer than 200 weapons in circulation? Nothing could be less certain! During the year 1990 a cache of 300 semiautomatic guns was discovered at Tebessa, and nearer here, in early 1992, two shipments of weapons concealed in cargo containers from European ports were caught in the nets of the security services. On the other hand, how many instruments of death did get through to swell the arsenal of the fundamentalist assassins?

No one is capable of providing a precise answer to that question. At most, it can be said that the fundamentalist terrorists are utilizing to the maximum the weapons in their possession. The perpetrators of the attack on Tahar Hamdi disclosed that they had returned their weapons immediately following their ignoble act, and these weapons were undoubtedly used by another gang of murderers several hours later....

The rest is mere detail. What does it matter to Fouad that the bullet that closed his eyes was manufactured in a suburb of Tel Aviv or in New Guinea? What does it matter whether the treacherous revolver that cut down Karima at dusk one spring day was manufactured in Czechoslovakia or elsewhere? The only thing for certain is that so long as a single weapon remains in circulation and there is a dehumanized and fanaticized zombie to carry it, it will be a brother or a sister—a bearer of the noble precepts of the Republic—who will be threatened with death.



**'Abd-al Hamid on Closer Ties, Security Issues**  
*93AF0572D Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French*  
27 Apr 93 p 3

[Interview with Al-Shafi 'Abd-al-Hamid, special envoy of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, by Mohamed Benaissa; in Algiers; date not given.]

[Text] During his visit to Algiers, Mr. Al-Shafi 'Abd-al-Hamid, the special envoy of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, kindly agreed to speak with us about relations between Egypt and Algeria and about international matters that figure prominently among the concerns of the two countries.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Mr. Minister, you met with the president of the Higher State Council, Mr. Ali Kafi. What was the subject of your visit?

[Abd-al-Hamid] I have indeed had the honor of meeting with Mr. Ali Kafi, president of the Higher State Council. During our meeting, which lasted nearly 50 minutes, I conveyed to the president of the Higher State Council an invitation to attend the summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which will take place in Cairo in June 1993. I was also the bearer of a letter addressed to him by President Hosni Mubarak, regarding bilateral relations. Our discussions were warm and completely candid. I shall report on the content of our meeting to President Hosni Mubarak who will carefully and respectfully study the points of view expressed by the president of the High Committee of State.

[EL MOUDJAHID] In light of the bloody events now shaking the African continent, will the OAU summit agenda be a full one?

[Abd-al-Hamid] Indeed, there will be two key subjects to discuss at the summit meeting. The first is the resurgence of disputes between African brothers. In certain African countries, these disputes have led to civil wars. Algeria, since its war of liberation, and Egypt both have special commitments to the African continent. The next phase requires a new approach toward the settlement of the crises that have shaken the continent. The other subject to be addressed is the economic situation. At the summit meeting in Abuja (Nigeria), we reached agreement on certain provisions of an economic nature. The African leaders will take the opportunity of their meeting in Cairo in June to develop a program of economic action for our continent.

[EL MOUDJAHID] The similarity of security concerns in Algeria and Egypt must have been the main subject of talks with Algerian officials. What is your assessment?

[Abd-al-Hamid] Without a doubt, cooperation between Algeria and Egypt should be broadened at all levels, top to bottom. It should also encompass all sectors—political, economic, social, cultural, financial, and scientific. This is a necessity not only because of the historic ties between Algeria and Egypt but also because of Arab and African interests. The two countries therefore play a

vital and essential role in the African and Arab world by virtue of their political responsibilities on the international stage.

[EL MOUDJAHID] In response to terrorism and religious extremism, the two countries have begun working together to counter foreign interference, particularly coming from Iran and Sudan that are exploiting the situation for the purpose of destabilizing Egypt and Algeria. What steps should be taken against this?

[Abd-al-Hamid] Broader and deeper relations between Algeria and Egypt are basic to the stability of North Africa and the Arab world, and on the African level as well. The regional security threats posed by Iran and Sudan are elements of the existing situation that must be studied. At the next African summit in June, we—Algeria and Egypt—will have the opportunity to discuss these problems at the bilateral level so as to give concrete expression to our mutual interests and protect them against external interference.

But it should also be noted that the source of extremism in Egypt and Algeria is foreign to the Arab region. And while irresponsible behavior and practices are taking place in Sudan, that should in no manner affect the friendship and relations between the Sudanese and Egyptian peoples, or those who are commonly known as the peoples of the northern and southern Nile River regions.

However, Iran's race toward massive rearmament and its attempts to acquire the nuclear weapon raise a host of questions. It is a threat that must be rigorously, objectively, and continually watched by us.

[EL MOUDJAHID] On another subject that intimately involves Arab security—the Arab-Israeli conflict—can we expect positive results from the ninth session of bilateral negotiations, given Egypt's important role in the resumption of talks?

[Abd-al-Hamid] Our goal is the application of Resolutions 242 and 338, the principle of "land for peace," self-determination, and the creation of a Palestinian state. Egypt will spare no effort to attain these goals. Stability in the Arab region and the Middle East hinges on respect for international law. Furthermore, we reject the notion of a "double standard." The Palestinian people must have the same rights as those granted to other peoples. That is why we praise the Palestinian delegation for the respect it has won from the international community. It is clear that one day soon, the Palestinians will build their own nation on their land.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Regarding the North African region, the Lockerbie conflict between Libya and three Western nations (the United States, Great Britain, and France) is still without a solution. What are the prospects following President Hosni Mubarak's visits to certain Western countries?

[Abd-al-Hamid] Libya is important to Egypt for three reasons. First, there are historic links between Libya and

Egypt. Second, our country borders on Libya. The third reason is the presence of no fewer than 500,000 Egyptians in Libya. Because of that state of affairs, we have an even greater responsibility to ensure Arab security.

We have consistently asked that Libya not be put to a test that might violate its integrity or that of the Libyan people. President Mubarak has managed to defer any decision in the matter by the three Western countries, so that the dispute can be settled peacefully. This 'truce' will make possible a peaceful settlement of differences. However, we will steadfastly demand that decisions made under international law be respected. On that basis, we will pursue our effort to reconcile the various positions.

## ISRAEL

### Israeli Muslim Incitement Against Peace Talks

93AA0059E Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 May 93  
p 2

[Article by Yosef Elgazi: "Moving To Open Incitement"]

[Text] "The Minister of Labor Namir confirmed that she had reached an agreement with the Islamic movement," the Nazareth weekly A-SINARA claims, but that is not preventing the movement's journal from publishing veiled threats against the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks and their supporters.

"The Minister of Labor and Welfare, Ora Namir, confirmed that on the eve of the latest Knesset elections she reached an agreement with the Islamic movement via Shaykh Abd'allah Nimir Darawish," the Nazareth weekly A-SINARA reported in a front-page article at the end of the week. "The agreement, according to Minister Namir, was to the effect that the Islamic movement would not call on people to boycott the elections, would soften its attacks on the Labor party, and would act in other ways for its benefit." According to the paper, the meeting was "secret" and was arranged with the agreement of the chairman of the party, Yitzhaq Rabin. The paper further reported that Namir confirmed the existence of the agreement in a meeting with the people of the village of Tamra in Galilee.

In response to my question, the editor of A-SINARA, Lutfi Mash'ur, added that the information in his paper comes from two participants in the meeting with Minister Namir in Tamra. Another participant in the meeting, Dr. Hashim ibn-Rumi, the chairman of the local council of Tamra, said: "In her public pronouncements at the meeting I did not hear Minister Namir say the things that were attributed to her in A-SINARA, but the rumor about it had spread even before her visit to the village; the remarks may have been uttered in the framework of a more restricted meeting with her in which I did not take part."

In reaction to the report, both Minister Namir and Shaykh Darawish confirmed the fact of the meeting between them on the eve of the elections but denied that they had come to any kind of agreement. Minister Namir noted that she holds "very long meetings with the shaykh that deal with various and sundry political issues" and that "it is clear that on the eve of the elections they also concerned the voting of Israeli Arabs. Shaykh Darawish is a very interesting man, and I am interested in the modus operandi of the Islamic movement, that employs a tactic of radical religious political penetration by means of social issues such as maintaining kindergartens and infirmaries and care of young people and families."

The report in A-SINARA reverberated throughout Arab political circles because of the heating up of the election process for Arab local authorities and because of the recently noted sharpening of the Islamic movement's attack against renewal of the diplomatic talks in Washington and against its political opponents. The propaganda of the Islamic movement's spokesmen sometimes includes open incitement of a religious, ethnic, and national character.

Last Friday the Islamic movement organized a national demonstration in Nazareth against the expulsion of the Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists to Lebanon, against the closing of the territories, and against the agreement by the Arab states and the PLO to renew discussions with Israel. In a poster calling for demonstrations, signed by "the Islamic movement within the Green Line," the renewal of the talks was defined as "final submission to the will of United States and the aspirations of the conquest." Some of the slogans in the demonstration stressed the unity of Palestine.

The weekly publication of the Islamic movement in Israel, SAWT AL-HAQQ WAL-HURRIYAH [VOICE OF JUSTICE AND FREEDOM], which, since the expulsion, has opened its pages to the spokesmen of Hamas and those expelled to Lebanon, last Friday published—with a lot of fanfare—an interview with the leader of Hamas in Gaza and the spokesman of the expellees in Lebanon, Dr. Abd Al-Aziz Rantisi. The latter defined the renewal of talks in Washington as "provocation against the will of the people" and "treason against the expellees and the entire Palestinian populace." Regarding the Palestinian delegation, Rantisi said that it "was not chosen by anyone and was appointed with Shamir's blessing." Regarding Israel's agreement to return 30 veteran expellees, he said that it was a matter of "a deal achieved at the expense of the expellees in Marj a-Zahur, that is testimony to the depths to which the Palestinian delegation has sunk," and defined it as "a shameful sin, that the people would reject and see as a real danger." Rantisi forwarded a special blessing, in the name of all the expellees, to Shaykh Ra'ad Salah, the mayor of Umm al-Fahm.

In another speech on the same topic, by Shihab ad-Din, the author defined the agreements by the Arab states, the PLO, and the Palestinian delegation as "sticking a knife



in the back," "a big sin against Jerusalem, al-Aqsa [the mosque], the holy places, the Palestinian people, Islam, and the Muslims." He threatened: "God will not forgive and the people will have no mercy on all those who participated in this hasty deed, this plot and those who stuck a knife in the people's back."

In an editorial, the editor in chief of the journal of the Islamic movement, HALID AHMAD MAHANA, wrote: "The latest knife to be stuck in the back of the heroes of Marj a-Zahur by the Arab leadership is the reception that Mubarak arranged for the leader of expulsion and transfer (Yitzhaq Rabin—Y.E.) in order to make himself look good in the eyes of his people and the eyes of the world; the time has come to put an end to these provocations."

Last week, SAWT AL-HAQQ WAL HURRIYAH published an article by the deputy chief of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt, Mustafa Mashhur. In the article he attacked the very existence of the talks and all their Arab participants because of the willingness to achieve "normalization" in their relations with the State of Israel. In particular he attacked the government of Egypt, which he claims is eliminating from its curriculum everything that was written against the Jews and is allowing Jewish tourists to introduce all kinds of corruption into Egypt, permitting them to turn Egypt into a laboratory for AIDS experiments, to distribute drugs and forged dollars, and to debase agriculture.

"The problem of Palestine does not belong to the Arab leaders and the Palestinians who remained in Gaza and the West Bank, but to all Muslims," he wrote, and warned that "the day is not far off when the Arab peoples and the Muslims will reject any solution that is contrary to the liberation of Palestine and the liberation of the al-Aqsa mosque."

A lecturer in the Muslim religious college in Jerusalem who signs his name as "Abu al-Hamam" published an article in the same issue calling on Muslims to go the "soldierly" route. "Preaching and soldiership are identical, but soldiership is one degree higher than preaching because it involves strength, obligation, and constancy," he claimed. The author uses the word "soldiership" in order to avoid the loaded word "combat"—so as not to be accused of calling for the spread of Islam by preaching and by the sword.

The journal of the Islamic movement regularly reports casualties on the Israeli side in a tone of joy at the calamity of others. For example, "a black sabbath for the Israeli Army; the Army killed an Israeli policeman and wounded two soldiers; a soldier was killed and two others wounded in a traffic accident; a soldier committed suicide; six soldiers were wounded." The newspaper headlined one of the two articles about the booby-trapped car that exploded several weeks ago in Mehula, "It did not succeed in dropping victims, but this is a turning point; the explosion of the booby-trapped car is arousing the concern of the Israelis."

In another article, Ahmad Shalabi, a lecturer at the University of Cairo, compares the crusaders in the Middle Ages to "the modern crusaders," as he calls them—the United States, that "leads the world without regret and exists by virtue of the Star of David, the symbol of Zionism." According to him, it is conducting a "Jewish-crusader campaign against Islam and the Muslims"; "the new assault has been successful in taking over a valuable part of Arab land, Palestine; it is erasing its name, expelling its inhabitants and killing many of them, as the Christians did in Spain under the rule of the Christian kings"; "the modern crusader forces cross seas and borders, and they have dangerous centers in different areas, the most important of which is the dangerous center in Palestine, that was not satisfied with taking over this homeland but is also eyeing and attacking neighboring countries"; "and like the scorpion is striking in different directions."

But the attack is not only against the Arab states and the PLO, but also against Arabs in the State of Israel, including the Christians and the Druze. The pages of SAWT AL-HAQQ WAL HURRIYAH recently published articles attacking "those Christians among the Palestinian people who try to sow discord by describing the Islamic movement as a movement stricken with ethnicity and religious fanaticism," in the words of Kamil Katib, one of the leaders of the Islamic movement in Galilee. In a series of articles against secularism, Katib reminded his readers that Muslims constitute 80 percent of the Palestinian people and therefore there is an "obligation to respect the opinion of the majority."

In recent months, various political groups in the Arab sector have expressed fear of the results of incitement against the Christians and the Druze, which they say is likely to bring about serious confrontations among the Palestinians. "Christians in Galilee feel themselves threatened," says one person in the north of Israel. "Some of them have chosen to flee Israel, and others are signing up for the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]. They feel that the fanatical Muslims want to force their will on them by the strength of the fact that they constitute a majority of the Arab population, and if they do not succeed in doing so, they will try to isolate them like the Druze." Another source revealed that in the discussions held by representatives of the Druze Initiative Council in Israel with the leadership of the PLO in Tunis, the question arose of "the incitement of radical Muslim circles."

In an article that attorney Farj Sulman wrote at the end of the week in KUL AL-ARAB, he exposed a phenomenon that various sources within the Arab population have been warning about for some time. In certain mosques, he wrote, sermons are preached against three enemies of Islam: "Christianity (in first place), Communism (in second place), and Judaism (in third place)."

About the Muslim fundamentalist slogan "Islam is the solution," Sulman asked: "Is this slogan intended to keep the Christian Arab away from the national struggle?"

Will they agree to flying flags with the symbol of the cross for solving our problems? What will they say if the Druze movement inscribes on its flag the slogan "Druze is the solution"? What benefit do they derive from attacking non-Muslim religions and from accusing them of being alien and connected in one way or another with imperialism? What benefit do they derive from writing that is superficially forgiving but in content is nothing but threats and warnings?

Sulman's article had positive reverberations in Arab political circles in Israel and the territories. There were those who praised his courage and especially the fact that he was not afraid to say that he was Christian.

In another article in SAWT AL-HAQQ WAL HUR-RIYAH, the author, who signs his name as Muhammad Isa Abdallah, attacked the Christian journalists Saliba Hamis, Atallah Mansur, and Lutfi Mash'ur, who frequently write in A-SINARA, and accused them of "vilifying Islam." He wrote about Hamis that "he is going down the path of Farj 'Uda." Hamis and others see these words as a threat on his life because Farj 'Uda, an Egyptian Muslim philosopher who polemicized against Muslim fundamentalists, was murdered last year by fanatical Muslims in Egypt.

In another article, Kasim Zaid warns Arab Christians "who fear the growing strength of Islam," not to be westernized lest they lose their identity.

However, the preferred enemies of the Islamic movement are Rakah and Hadash. On Land Day, movement activists blew up the central assembly hall in Shefar'am and prevented MK [member of Knesset] Tufiq Ziad from completing his speech. In its description of the violent confrontation, the journal of the Islamic movement revealed what, among other things, bothered the activists of the movement in the assembly hall: "At the moment when the communist chorus and its front, led by the women, was calling for unity, national unity, the young man alongside the lass, unity, national unity, Druze, Islam, and Christianity, tens of Druze border policemen were waving their rifles and cudgels in the faces of the demonstrators."

The mayor of Umm al-Fahm, Shaykh Ra'ad Salah, who aspires to the leadership of the Islamic movement in Israel, does not deny that the goal of his movement is control of Islam. At the end of the week he wrote: "It is not important which person rules, the main thing is that Islam rule; the rule of Islam is not the private affair of the Islamic movement but of every Arab and every Palestinian, even if he is not Muslim.... All those who attack the Islamic movement and ask it not to mix politics and religion are fighting Islam."

The Islamic movement is vigorously preparing for the election campaign for local authorities. Its leaders are striving to increase their accomplishments in comparison to the previous municipal elections. "We will make every effort to maintain the mayoralty of Umm al-Fahm in our hands and the leadership of the local councils of

Kafr Qasim, Jajuliyah, Kafr Bara, Kabul, and Rahat," says the leader of the movement, Shaykh Kamil Katib. "We will also work to elect our representatives to the leadership of the local councils in Kafr Qana and Til Shaba; it is still early to talk about our organization for the elections for the city of Nazareth. God willing, the Islamic movement will increase its strength in the next elections for local authorities."

### Settler Antiautonomy PR Campaign Detailed

93AA0059B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 May 93  
p 2

[Article by Nadav Shragai: "You Do Not Sell Your Mother": One of the Slogans Being Tested by the Settlers for their Struggle"]

[Text] The Judea-Samaria-Gaza Council recently distributed a document to members of the council board and some right-wing MKs [members of Knesset] containing four possible alternatives for an open publicity campaign intended to rouse public opinion opposition to the idea of autonomy and the government's steps in negotiating with the Palestinians. The alternatives, described as a draft, were processed after a series of internal discussions.

Those addressed were asked to choose the alternative they preferred. Participating in the discussions that preceded the formulation of the document were the general secretary of the Judea-Samaria-Gaza Council, Uri Ari'el; the chairman of the council, Israel Har'el; spokespersons Aharon Dumov and Shai Bazaq; and Moshe Merhavia and Uri Elitzur, who 12 years ago headed the "Movement for Stopping the Withdrawal From Sinai." In contrast to the discussions that took place in the Judea-Samaria-Gaza Council during the Likud period of tenure, there was no one this time who tried to consult with the government on issues affecting the settlers with the aim of containing the damage during the negotiations. The general opinion was that "there is no one to talk to" in the Labor party.

The first alternative in the document is termed "Autonomy: a Disaster." These are its main points (the quotes are from the document):

- "Definition of the problem: Fog is acting like a tranquilizer. Autonomy is possible precisely because no one knows what it is. The solution: To dispel the fog and arouse fear and opposition. The message: Autonomy will not solve any problem. It will only create more difficult new problems. Terror will increase because of a lack of IDF [Israel Defense Force] control in the territory. The interim agreement will be only an opening for a more violent struggle over a permanent agreement."
- "Advantages: Direct handling of the immediate problem on the agenda. Disadvantages: Both Labor and Likud support autonomy. The State of Israel has

already gone to Madrid and has already obligated itself. The campaign could be perceived as a rearguard action for a lost cause."

The second alternative in the document is termed "Against a Palestinian State." Its main points:

—"Definition of the problem: 1. It is hard to arouse a direct struggle against autonomy because of the above difficulties. 2. People know deep down that autonomy will lead to a Palestinian state, but they repress it because the permanent solution is not yet on the agenda. The solution: 1. To attack autonomy indirectly without even mentioning the word by strengthening the opposition to a Palestinian state. 2. To bring up for public debate precisely the issue of the permanent solution. To push the government to real steps and obligations promising that a Palestinian state will not come into being, thereby complicating the negotiations over the interim agreement, as well. The message: A Palestinian state is the beginning of the end of the State of Israel."

—"Advantages: Apparently there is national consensus against a Palestinian state. We could also enlist left-wingers in the publicity campaign, and even non-Jews from America. Disadvantages: The permanent agreement is not yet relevant. People do not get excited about a danger that will happen in seven or eight years."

The third alternative is called: "Do Not Believe Rabin."

—"Definition of the problem: People believe that Rabin could bring peace and security, too. The solution: To undermine that confidence and make people want to think for themselves. The message: Do not trust them. Think for yourselves."

—"The left will control the courses of action. Rabin is not in control of the situation. Think about it for yourselves: How can there be self-government that does not lead to a Palestinian state? Think about it for yourselves: How will it be possible to defend Tel Aviv when Hizballah will be just a quarter-hour trip away from Dizengof? Think about it for yourselves: Are they withstanding the pressures?"

The fourth alternative is called: "You Do Not Sell Your Mother."

—"Definition of the problem: 1. The pragmatic approach is a game on the Left's playing field. We are trying to answer their questions (Who needs Gaza?), instead of presenting our questions to the public and having the Left answer them. 2. All the scare tactics do not work because the small troubles of today are more pressing than the big troubles of tomorrow. The solution: To raise the flag of ideology and move the debate to the areas of historic, Zionist feeling and identification. The message: The Land of Israel is worth the hardship and the price."

—"Advantages: This is our truth. The truth is stronger than any sophisticated argumentation. Religious arguments are gathering strength in the new world (even if there is no identification or sympathy). Disadvantages: The struggle is for the very long term. The starting point is outside the consensus."

#### **Population, Immigration Statistics on Jerusalem**

93AA0059D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Apr 93  
p 6

[Article by Nadav Shragai: "560,000 Inhabitants in Jerusalem; The Proportion of the Jewish Population Grew Slightly With the Immigration"]

[Text] The population of Jerusalem numbered more than 560,000 people at the end of 1992, and it is the largest city in Israel. At the end of 1991, 393,000 Jews and 151,000 non-Jews lived in the city. The waves of immigration have resulted in the fact that since 1990, the Jewish proportion of the population has risen slightly compared to the non-Jewish population.

The balance of internal immigration in Jerusalem continues to be negative, and it is the most negative since the unification of the city.

These data were given out yesterday in a news conference held by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Research and the Municipality of Jerusalem on the occasion of the publication of the Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem for 1991.

The *Statistical Yearbook* shows that since the unification of the city and up to the beginning of the intifadah, there has been a downward trend in the birthrates of the non-Jewish population and an increase in the birthrates of the Jewish population, stemming mainly from the high birthrates of the ultra-Orthodox population in Jerusalem.

Since 1988, there has again been an increase in the birthrates of the non-Jewish population, with a trend toward stabilization last year.

The ratio of Jews to Arabs in the capital today is 72 percent Jews versus 28 percent non-Jews, most of them Muslims. From 1967 until 1991, the population of Jerusalem doubled (from 266,300 in 1967 to 544,200 in 1991). During this period the Jewish population grew by 99 percent and the non-Jewish population by 121 percent.

#### **High Natural Increase**

The natural increase in Jerusalem is greater than in Israel. The cause of these differences is first and foremost the high birthrate among the ultra-Orthodox and Muslim populations. In 1991, among the Jewish population in Jerusalem, 27 babies were born for every 1,000 people, while only 18.6 were born among the overall Israeli population. The birthrates of the non-Jewish population in Jerusalem are even higher than those of the Jews (32.4

per thousand people), but lower than those in Israel (34 percent) [sentence as published].

The balance of internal immigration to Jerusalem since 1988 continues to be negative. In 1991 it reached a peak of minus 5,600 Jews. Contributing to the high negative balance were also 1,800 new immigrants who stopped living in Jerusalem. The immigrants are counted upon their entry to Jerusalem in the category of homesteaders, and upon leaving Jerusalem, as internal emigrants. Most of the emigrants from Jerusalem, about 66 percent, move on to live in the territories, in areas adjacent to the city, which accelerates the development of the Jerusalem metropolitan area.

In 1991 about 14,000 immigrants settled in Jerusalem, and in 1992 that number dropped to 7,300. Jerusalem is not the main attraction for immigrants from the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. In 1988 about 22 percent of the immigrants who came to Israel settled there; in 1989, only 12.7 percent; in 1991, only 7.8 percent; and in 1992, only 8.1 percent of the immigrants who came to Israel settled there.

Since 1989, about 35,000 immigrants have been added to the city. The attractiveness of Jerusalem for immigrants from developed countries is higher than it is for those from depressed countries (the CIS, Ethiopia, and Latin America).

The immigrants from the CIS choose to live mainly in the outskirts of Jerusalem: Gila, Ramot, Neve Ya'akov, and Talpiot Mizrah, as well as in Qiryat Hayovel, Ir Ganim, and Qiryat Menahem, neighborhoods where housing is relatively inexpensive. The immigrants from the developed countries concentrate mainly in the old neighborhoods within Jerusalem proper.

From the findings of research on the status of immigrants from depressed countries conducted by Dr. Maya Hoshen and Israel Qimhi at the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Research, in cooperation with the Municipal Immigration Absorption Authority and the Strategic Planning Unit within the municipality of Jerusalem, the preferences and status of immigrants were determined with regard to life in Jerusalem and the system of services provided by the municipality.

#### About 50 Percent of the Immigrants Are Employed

The level of satisfaction of the immigrants in Jerusalem is high. About 86 percent of the new immigrants expressed satisfaction with the neighborhoods in which they live. Close to half of the immigrants work, half of them in their profession. For about 40 percent of those who received professional training, that training helped them in finding work.

Additional data from the *Yearbook*:

—Labor and Salary. The proportion of industry in Jerusalem is low: 11.4 percent of the employees as compared to 21.6 percent in Israel and 15.8 percent in Tel Aviv-Jaffa.

—Construction. In 1991 Jerusalem began the construction of 560,000 square meters, of which 468,000 square meters were for housing (4,165 apartments) as compared to 1989 in which construction began on 292,000 square meters, of which 196,000 square meters were for housing. In 1991 the construction of 1,615 apartments was completed in Jerusalem, as compared to 2,060 apartments that were completed in 1989.

—Transportation. The level of vehicle ownership continued to rise. There were 170.6 vehicles per thousand residents in 1991 as compared to 105.6 vehicles per thousand residents in 1980.

—Accidents. The number of accidents continued to rise and reached 1,385 accidents, in which 2,119 people were injured.

—Education. During the 1992 academic year, in Jewish schools, about 14,600 children were educated in kindergartens, about 50,400 children were in primary schools, and about 46,100 were in post-primary schools. In the religious schools, about 15,400 children were enrolled—from kindergarten to the 9th grade. In the Arab sector, about 18,400 children were enrolled in the municipal education system.

In the religious schools, the average class size is smaller than the average in the other educational sectors. In a government primary school the average number of pupils per class is 30.8, while in the official Arab school it is 34.5, and in the religious school, 23.5.

#### Return of Golan: Rabin's Victory, Likud's Loss

93AA0053C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Apr 93  
p B1

[Article by Y. Marcus: "They Have Lost the North"]

[Text] Do not say that serious things are not happening in the opposition camp. Thanks to Bibi Netanyahu's energy, the elevators stuck at Metzudat Ze'ev have begun to work, and there is no need to climb up 14 floors by foot. The water cooler has been repaired and again supplies cold water. The telephones were also reconnected after the bills were paid, and you can depend on Netanyahu that, slowly, he will also find an arrangement to cover the rest of the Likud's heavy debts.

But, if beyond these partings of the way there would be another one—for example: Rabin's government should collapse—Heaven forbid—and the Likud would have to suddenly return to power—a great disaster would befall him. "Disaster," I say, because, while Rabin's government is finally starting to indicate a political course, it is



still unclear, very unclear what the opposition, in general, and the Likud, in particular, want and propose. This void was very conspicuous at the special recess meeting that was held in the Knesset this week. The opposition, which wanted to show some muscle and shake the door posts, roared, "meow." Afterward, they all went to the sea. The "demonstration of the masses to stop the fold up," which was organized in Menorah Square on the same night by all of the opposition parties, was a small, evening demonstration attended primarily by a few thousand activists and settlers, but not an event in which the broad public was involved [sentence as published]. It appears that the Likud, whose specialty has always been to ride the wave of populism, still does not understand the public's mood, which, at this moment, is in favor of giving peace a chance.

The difference between the government and the opposition is—at least at this moment—that the government has a clear course. It does not matter what was publicly said for tactical reasons—in principle, they are willing to give up most of the territories for peace (and security). If President al-Asad was ready for a separate peace agreement with Israel—and from Washington talks this week, it does not appear that he is ready for this—I have no doubt that Rabin would not hesitate to return sovereignty over all of the Heights to Syria. Clinton knows this. The public in Israel senses this truth in the air and, nevertheless, Israel is not alarmed. Furthermore, the blockade in the territories, which was an incidental and temporary move, won great support, and there is public pressure to continue it. That fact that, with this, Rabin's government is returning the state to the 1967 lines (more or less) has not shaken the country. And this is perhaps the biggest surprise and revelation. Some time ago, the government had the opportunity to ride on the "fed-up" wave and on the general longing to carry out a divorce between the two nations—cost what it may. Thus, Rabin's government stole the Likud's most precious asset: the populace.

In the opposition camp, only two elements have a clear course—the settlers, who want neither an arrangement nor peace, only that the territories remain ours; and Rahav'am Ze'evi, the only politician on the right who has a proposal for a clear political solution. But, these two are the minority in the political system. The main body, and is that not the Likud, without which a right-wing government is not possible, cannot find its arms and legs in the situation that has been created and has no alternative path to that of Rabin's government.

Everything that we hear from the leaders who are fighting among themselves is nothing more than empty slogans, shots from the hip, and technical criticism of the governments tactics. Two, not totally refuted, arguments are being heard in the Likud: One, that Rabin has put himself (perhaps because of the expulsion) in the absurd position that he must pay the Palestinians in order that they will agree to negotiate with him. The second, that he involved the American government too much in the

negotiations, and for this, sooner or later, the government will force its proposals for an agreement on us.

Nu, so what? What would the Likud propose if they suddenly found themselves in power? Ask 10 of their party workers and you will get 50 answers. One will say, "Let us return to the Madrid format"; one will say, "Let us be tougher in negotiations"; one will say that we should insist on "peace for peace"; and one will say, "Let us make order in the territories." But we have gone through all of this already. It does not work. Already 15 years earlier, Menahem Begin not only gave up the entire Sinai, to the last millimeter for peace, but also at Camp David, laid the foundations for the establishment of a Palestinian national entity. There is no precedent for an autonomy that the Motherland did not lose, the moment it was established.

Since then, too many things have happened—from the uprising in the territories and the hunger for national independence to uncovering the weakness of our rear, which will make it difficult for us to withstand another war—for us to use the tactic of delay and inaction. The Likud wants to conduct the upcoming war over peace according to the methods of the previous war. It did not work then, and it will not work now. Not in the field. Not in America. Not in the world. So, what does the Likud propose? That we annex, that we fortify ourselves, that we fight and struggle against the entire world? What the Likud proposes, in actuality, is that we live forever by our swords. Who wants that?

This is not an alternative and it is not a substitute for the current power. The Likud will, indeed, hold its conference next month in the Golan Heights. But, in the meantime, there is the impression that they have lost the north. Primarily, it lost the populace. At least temporarily. Everything depends on Rabin's ability to run forward on the peace track and to guarantee personal security, which, at this time, is the will of the people.

#### **Analysis of State Lands Status, Settler Fears**

93AA0053D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Apr 93  
p 3

[Article by N. Shergay: "The Settlers Fear the Fate of State Land"]

[Text]

#### **Background**

News of the gestures and proposals of compromise that Israel is planning to raise in the framework of negotiations with the Palestinians do not cease to trouble the settlers.

Last week it was the Palestinian police; the day before yesterday, news of the plan to return old-time exiles; and yesterday the settlers received confirmation of published news, according to which the Israeli delegation intends

to propose broader management of the land in the territories within the framework of autonomy.

The settlers especially fear the fate of state land. About 90 percent of the settlements in the territories were established on state land, and the remainder on land of Jewish ownership from before the War of Liberation and on land of Jewish ownership purchased by parties after the Six Day War.

In 1979, the High Court of Justice forbade the establishment of permanent settlements on private land that had been confiscated for security purposes.

Peli'a Albeq, subsequently manager of the civilian department in the Ministry of Justice, found indirect means, and settlements were established on land that the military government proclaimed to be state land.

At the end of the days of Likud rule, the process was accelerated, and tens of thousands of dunams were proclaimed to be state land.

In Judaea and Samaria, 5.6 million dunams of land and, according to a general estimate, more than a third of it defined as state land, primarily in the desolate territory of the Judean Desert, on the eastern slopes, from central Samaria to the Jordan Valley, the mountains in northern and western Samaria, and a bit of land in the district of Binyamin and central Samaria.

State lands are divided into three categories: The first—about 1 million dunams of land registered in Tabu, owned by the state; the second—about 1 million dunams that were proclaimed state land, but have never been registered in its name; the third—about an additional million dunams that are permitted to be localized, proclaimed as state land, and can be seized by force, but no action has been taken on them.

#### **It Is Reasonable That No More State Land Will Be Proclaimed**

The settlers do not believe that Rabin's government will initiate any further action of proclaiming state land, and therefore it is not reasonable that such action will be taken regarding the million dunams in the third category. What worries them is what the fate will be of the land in the first and second categories.

Almost all of the territory of the land reserves designated for the continuation of development in the settlements' contour plans is state land. In many cases, it refers to land many times—often five or ten times—the size of the settlement.

Usually, these land reserves, state land, adjoin settlement fences, and extend to the borders of Palestinian settlements or to fields worked by Palestinian villages.

On 15 Shevat, hundreds of settlers, on the initiative of the Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza (YESHA) council, conducted a planting operation on the state land found outside of the settlement fences. The Israel Defense

Force (IDF) uprooted, in a symbolic action, only a few hundred of the trees that were planted next to Beyt 'Ayin, in Gush 'Etzion.

In the YESHA council, it is feared that handing powers over to the autonomy council, even on desolate land not populated by Palestinians or settlers, will severely damage the development of the settlements and will perpetuate the policy of freezing the settlements, decided by Rabin's government.

In the previous round of talks, Israel proposed dividing state land in the territories into three categories: Land on which Jews now live would remain in Jewish hands; land on which Palestinians now live would remain in Palestinian hands; and land defined as state land would be handed over for the joint management of the autonomy council and Israel.

The Palestinians rejected the proposal, and the settlers breathed a sigh of relief. According to the new information published recently, Israel is about to propose to the Palestinians sole, not joint, management of at least part of the state land. This apparently refers to the proclaimed land that was never registered in Tabu.

#### **Concern for the Long Range**

Most of the settlers in the territories do not suffer from land deprivation—the opposite—most of them have land reserves for a long period of time.

The settlers are afraid of what will happen in another 5, 6, or 10 years. Israel's proposals of compromise in connection with land in the territories are liable to suspend plans to continue development of the settlements, even in the case where the political situation changes and the right-wing parties return to power in Israel.

#### **Incorporating MLRS Into IDF Order of Battle**

93AA0059C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 May 93 p B2

[Article by Aluf Ben: "A Rain of Steel in the Depth of the Battlefield"]

[Text] Last week the Defense Ministry officially announced to the U.S. government that Israel is asking to purchase the MLRS [multibarreled rocket launching system] for use by the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] Gunnery Corps. Thus, one of the IDF's largest purchase deals in recent years has gotten under way, one that will include tens of launchers and thousands of rockets, with a monetary value of \$308 million. For the first time since 1974, the ground forces will acquire a principal weapons system of American manufacture.

The Gunnery Corps needs rocket launchers in order to be able to lay down heavy fire on the enemy at long range. As early as 1984, the Corps recommended equipping with the MLRS, but Artillery was low man on the



IDF totem pole and was not allocated budgets like those of the Air Force and Armor. Its development programs were delayed for years.

Internal struggles and debates within the defense establishment preceded the decision to purchase the MLRS and centered on what would be the artillery weapon of the future—the American rockets or the “Sholef” gun produced by the Soltam Corporation. The army brass preferred the rockets.

At the end of last year, Chief of Staff Ehud Barak returned from a visit to the United States and decided to put an end to the debates and to accelerate the purchase of the MLRS. The prime minister and defense minister, Yitzhaq Rabin, authorized the recommendations of the chief of staff on 19 February of this year.

Professional sources estimate that the MLRS systems will go into operational service in the IDF in the coming years, after completion of the purchase process, the training of the operators, and the establishment of a logistics infrastructure. But the debates have not ended: Ta'as [Israeli military industries], which proposed that the IDF purchase rocket launchers of its own manufacture and was rebuffed, is now asking to participate in the manufacture of ammunition for the MLRS. MK [member of Knesset] Efrayim Sneh submitted a question to Rabin in which he petitioned to know why the IDF will not equip with launchers and rockets of local manufacture.

The defense establishment explains that the purchase of the MLRS is budgeted entirely from U.S. military aid funds, and there are no free shekels in the defense budget for the purchase of Israeli-made launchers and ammunition. It was decided to equip in the first stage with a quantity of rocket ammunition of U.S. manufacture and not to be obligated to purchase Israeli-made rockets. Ta'as intends to continue the struggle in the coming years, as well.

The company is developing a new generation of rockets with improved accuracy that could go into service within a few years. The IDF is asking for U.S. participation in the project and for the inclusion in the purchase contract of a paragraph on joint development of the model.

The MLRS system is built around a tracked launch vehicle, based on the American “Bradley” APC. Installed on the APC are two ammunition storage chests with six rockets in each. The rockets, with a diameter of 227 mm, each carry a warhead weighing 154 kg, within which are 644 cluster bombs that scatter over an area of 15-20 dunams. The launcher can shoot the dozen rockets that it holds one after the other and lay down strong firepower over a maximum range of 32 km. The minimum range of the rocket is 6 km.

In Germany a mine-carrying rocket was developed that can scatter 28 antitank mines over a range of 40 km. In

the United States and Europe, development has also begun on final guidance bomblets that can home in on tanks and other targets.

The artillery rockets came into widespread military use in the hands of the Germans and Russians in World War II. The armies of the United States and Britain were less enthusiastic about the new weapon and preferred the traditional guns.

The American Army began development of the MLRS, in cooperation with its NATO allies, in the mid-1970's. The result was “a technological jump of at least one generation in the area of artillery rockets,” according to the British expert Ian Hogg in his book *Artillery 2000*. “The MLRS is a very powerful force doubler. The system is very simple to operate, economical in manpower, and has massive firepower.”

The MLRS systems went into service in the American Army in 1983, and their baptism of fire was during the Gulf war, in which they earned a lot of praise for their accomplishments. The Pentagon's summary report on the war states that the rocket fire had “an enormous psychological influence on the Iraqi soldiers. The enemy soldiers were terrified by the destructive power of the rockets and dubbed them a ‘rain of steel.’”

The Pentagon report determined that the MLRS launchers “fired precision rounds in great volume day and night and under all weather conditions, and even in heavy rains and in dust storms.”

The MLRS achieved good results against infantry targets and nonarmored vehicles. The tracked vehicles were the only artillery system that succeeded in moving in a coordinated rhythm with the armor formations. Nevertheless, they were not effective against hardened, mobile targets.

The artillery rockets came into use in the IDF after they fell as Egyptian and Syrian booty in the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War. In the 1970's the military industry began to manufacture artillery rockets; first it produced ammunition for the Soviet launchers taken as booty, and later it began production of launchers and rockets of its own manufacture. The Gunnery Corps equipped itself with the Ta'as 290-mm four-barrel rocket system that saw service in the war in Lebanon.

Another Ta'as system, with a diameter of 160 mm, was developed expressly for the export markets and was sold to countries in Latin America, among them Venezuela.

The main disadvantage of the artillery rockets as compared to guns is the precision of the strike: The scattering of the MLRS rocket strikes is five times larger than that of a shell fired from a gun. The shell gains its velocity within the barrel and continues its flight to the target almost without external disturbances. The rocket is equipped with a motor and reaches its final velocity outside the launcher, on its way to the target. While the

motor is operational, the rocket is sensitive to the effects of the wind and other factors and can deviate from the predetermined course.

Because of this deficiency, artillery rockets were defined as "terrain weapons" and were not intended for a precision strike of targets. The old rockets, whose warheads were filled with explosives, were almost incapable of hitting a defined target. Also, the IDF gunners were not enthusiastic about the operational performance of the Ta'as rockets that saw service in the war in Lebanon.

The success of the MLRS in the Gulf war persuaded the IDF brass of the advantages of the rocket weapon, and in the IDF's multiyear plan, about \$300 million was budgeted for equipping with the MLRS system. The previous defense minister, Moshe Arens, wanted to test the Soltam "Sholef" gun. Cost-benefit tests were conducted in the Ta'as (artillery plant) in which the performance of various types of the Sholef gun were compared. The results showed that the improved rocket was better than the other alternatives.

Among professional elements, there are those who question the desirability of the attempt to turn the rocket launchers, that were intended to serve as terrain weapons, into precision weapons. But the IDF brass were intrigued by the promising possibilities of the new generation of rockets, and the supporters of MLRS were reinforced in their opinion that this was the weapon of the future for Israeli artillery. The supporters of the rockets pointed to their great flexibility and capacity for development in the future. Those who argued against them claimed that we must not use rocket launchers as a substitute for guns.

In advance of the decision on the purchase of the rocket launchers, Ta'as submitted a proposal to the Defense Ministry containing two alternatives: purchasing Israeli-developed launchers and ammunition instead of the MLRS or the local development and manufacture of ammunition for the MLRS, especially improved rockets.

Ta'as proposed developing a rocket launcher on an M-109 mobile gun chassis, the principal weapon of the IDF gunners, in order to achieve unity in maintenance. But the corporation heads knew they had no hope of selling the IDF the Israeli launcher, because the deal had been budgeted in military aid dollars, and the American system could be acquired off-the-shelf—while the Israeli alternative would require prolonged development and testing before it could go into regular production and supply.

The chairman of the Ta'as Board of Directors, Dan Shomron, proposed to Rabin that the launchers be purchased in the United States and the ammunition be manufactured in Israel. Ta'as complained that until today the IDF had never purchased a complete operational system in the United States. When it purchased planes, the bombs and missiles were produced in Israel;

when it bought tanks and guns, the shells were manufactured by Ta'as. We should not be dependent on the supply of ammunition from abroad, they said at Ta'as.

Ta'as suggested the IDF purchase an initial quantity of ammunition in the United States and meanwhile begin development of an Israeli model of the MLRS rocket. Likewise, they promised to begin production of free, nonguided rockets and, toward the end of the decade, to begin supplying improved rockets. The business advantage seems clear: Many armies the world over have equipped themselves with rocket launchers, and Ta'as could compete for the sale of ammunition abroad.

The IDF hopes to interest the Americans in the joint development of the improved rockets and thus enjoy the comfortable aid monies for future equipping, as well. Meanwhile they will buy a quantity of ammunition that will suffice for every launcher in wartime. "We have to leave an opening for the new technologies that will come to fruition with the improved rocket," they say in the army. "In the framework of this, or another, kind of cooperation with the Americans, Ta'as will be able to get into the manufacture of the ammunition. But we will not start local manufacture of the MLRS rockets now, nor must we obligate ourselves to do so in advance, since the Americans will want to supply us a full kit of launchers and ammunition."

In the coming weeks, the Israeli purchase request will be discussed among the officials in Washington, and after its expected approval, an IDF delegation will leave for the United States to open discussions on absorbing the MLRS systems and training the operators.

#### **Legacy of Sharon's Building Program Examined**

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pp 18-22

[Article by Y. Bar-Moha: "Sharon's Legacy"]

[Text] "At the Ministry of Housing, they are preparing to withstand a wave of thousands of suits by civilians. We are speaking of people who purchased apartments constructed by the "accelerated method," during Ari'el Sharon's years in the Ministry of Housing. Through an examination by HA'ARETZ, it turns out that less than three years after the start of the massive construction, which was presented as an operation in preparation for the absorption of immigrants, construction defects have been discovered in a significant number of these apartments that are liable to cost the state treasury almost as much as the cost of the apartment itself. The fear of a domino effect of thousands of suits by the purchasers greatly intensified last week, after the first ruling on this matter was handed down in the magistrate's court in Ashdod, in favor of the apartment purchaser. It was made known to HA'ARETZ that the present minister of housing, Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer, also plans to demand the establishment of a state commission of inquiry that will clarify the construction processes during Sharon's era. A declaration of this nature will, indeed, not save the

Ministry or the responsible contractors, but it is at least likely to make the current government immune from the anticipated public criticism, when damages amounting to enormous sums are given to thousands of purchasers.

Most ironic, the thousands of apartments sold were considered, until now, to be a secondary problem: As is known, there are more than 20,000 vacant apartments throughout the country, "phantom" apartments, the vast majority in neighborhoods built in the era of the "accelerated construction." But developments of the past two months inform us that actually those apartments that the government succeeded in getting rid of are the ones destined to become a very heavy burden on the state budget. Professor Elisha' Tetza, of the Tekhnion's architecture faculty, an expert and consultant in structural engineering, in recent weeks has been traveling intensively to the accelerated construction sites. In his estimation, a wave of suits lasting for two years is to be expected, because many defects are still not apparent.

Dr. Rahel Baqar, head of the department of the physical function of structures [as published] at the Tekhnion, joins in this opinion. She thinks that it will be possible to uncover all of the problems left by the fervent construction: "On paper, there is one plan, but in the field it was executed differently because of the acceleration. The incentives distributed by the government caused the contractors to cut corners." Natan Hilo, director of the branch of planning and engineering in the Ministry of Housing, places the blame today on the acceleration incentives that were given during Sharon's era: "It was an enticement; the contractors worked at night, too, and our inspectors did not succeed in catching the mistakes."

Damages that the government is likely to pay directly to the occupants, due to contractual obligations to be detailed below, will be added on to the budgetary yoke that is the creature of the Ministry of Housing's decisions. Many, indeed, would prefer to forget about the unfortunate results (Natan Hilo told us: "This is an era that I would like to erase from memory"), but the numbers continue to flow: The acquisition of 38,000 empty apartments from contractors (about 10 billion shekels); the construction of a base for neighborhoods that remain devoid of man (1 billion shekels); the transfer of incentives to contractors so that they would supply the apartments on schedule (more than 600 million shekels); guarding the empty buildings (1 million shekels per year)—and now, damages.

At the end of 1989, Israel heralded the opening of the Soviet Union's gates. The Likud and Labor then sat in one government; politicians from both camps sounded the word "preparation" at every opportunity. By the first wave, thousands of Jews were arriving each week, and Minister of the Treasury Shim'on Peres and Minister of Housing David Levi spoke of immediately building thousands of apartments. Levi did not succeed in heading the operation. After Labor's failed attempt at bringing down the government, he was advanced to the Foreign Ministry, and Ari'el Sharon took his place.

Ari'el Sharon's first decision in the "preparatory" phase was that that led, in the opinion of experts, to the woeful situation in which the government finds itself today. Sharon decided to grant dozens of new contractors government approval to build immigrant housing. In such a way, the "housing companies club," formed 18 years ago, was expanded, including large companies who were awarded the approval to receive administrative land. These were large companies that the state considered well-founded and responsible, among them Shiqun Vepituah, Solel Boneh, Shiqun 'Ovdim, Rasqo, Ash-trom, and others. After Sharon decided that the nation of Israel needed a bigger club, other contractors were awarded the title "housing company," among them, those who previously worked as subcontractors for large contractors. According to the claims of some of those interviewed for this report, approval was also given to people with no experience in construction, but had ties to the Likud.

The goal was the construction of 100,000 housing units, in addition to 500 caravans [as published], and the slogan was "speed." In order to achieve speed, an incentive was offered to contractors: 30,000 shekels for every housing unit that was completed within seven months, while for every month of delay they lose 3,000 shekels of that sum. Along with the incentive, the state also offered the contractors a security net: It was obligated to buy apartments that they did not succeed in selling.

Of course, not every contractor was able to join in the festivities; only those who fit the criteria, primarily the criteria of being well-founded financially. The Ministry of Housing's building in East Jerusalem became the contractors' pilgrimage site, among them entrepreneurs who had never before dealt in construction. An additional concession enjoyed by the contractors was the acceleration of procedures: The Ministry of Housing instructed that construction approval in the local and district committees take no longer than 60 days from the date that the request was submitted. In regions adjacent to large cities, contractors were given land at an 80-percent discount, and in development towns, land was given for free. In the middle of 1990, the accelerated construction project was on its way.

Ari'el Sharon's accelerated construction project was accompanied by admiring descriptions of the man who knows how to "raise up projects," and an expert in performance, not only words. In actuality, the project created the chance to become rich, for one who knows how to be quick, at the expense of quality, and it brought thousands of housing units into the world that do not hold up to standards. The greatest beneficiaries were dozens of contractors, some of whom took away the honey and split. In the Ministry of Housing, it is estimated that only about half of the 133 contractors who participated in the rapid construction will remain with the branch. As was stated, the Ministry was obligated to purchase, from the contractors, apartments that they did not succeed in selling, and these acquisitions were made

at prices that left nice profits in the hands of the contractors. Experts in the construction field have estimated that, in development towns such as Ma'alot, Nitivot, and Qatzrin, the cost for the construction of an apartment was an average of 80,000 shekels, and the state purchased such apartments from the contractors for between 160,000 to 180,000 shekels. In regions like Tiberius, Nesher, Eilat, and 'Afula, the state purchased apartments from contractors at a price of 200,000 shekels.

Now, two more groups benefiting from the oversights have naturally evolved: One group is the lawyers who are suing on behalf of groups of occupants, in return for 10 to 20 percent of the damages that they will be awarded. The second group are experts in structural inspection, who are also reaping pleasant fruits.

Severe structural defects were also discovered in apartments that were built by well-renowned companies. Facing the interest to complete the construction within seven months and to earn the guaranteed government incentive, the threshold of disgrace of professional, experienced builders was also undermined [sentence as published]. Up until today, more than 10 billion shekels have been spent in great and needless construction, and the project will involve an expenditure of another few billion for a foundation in the construction sites [sentence as published]. The total sum of incentives for accelerating construction received by contracting firms, for the construction of 32,850 housing units throughout the country, has reached 674,897,500 shekels. Dr. Rahel Baqar, head of the department of the physical function of structures at the Tekhnion, warns of foundation defects that are not visible to the eye: "I greatly hope that contractors did not cut too many corners, and my fear is also of the work by contractors who built using advanced, modern methods, in comparison to what is accepted in Israel, as well as of those who built with conventional methods. When corners are cut, the defects are discovered much later, in the case of disasters like earthquakes."

The department headed by Dr. Baqar was, indeed, asked by the Ministry of Housing to examine construction plans, in cases of modern methods of construction that were brought into the country with the accelerated construction project, but, according to her, up until 1990, many buildings were constructed with the modern methods without any examination. In cases where an examination was made, we are speaking only of an examination of plans: "We were asked to examine the plans, but not the construction in the field. This, for example, is how it was in 'Afula Hatz'i'ira.

[HA'ARETZ] And this is particular to construction with modern methods?

[Baqar] In progressive construction, it is impossible to cover up mistakes, and defective details will remain and, in the end, will be discovered. One plan appears on paper, and, in the field it was executed differently. The

incentives caused the contractors to cut corners, and when you run fast, the inspectors cannot find all of the defects, either.

[HA'ARETZ] But construction advisers are benefiting now, when occupants summon their opinion.

[Baqar] Yes. To my regret, the phenomenon exists where engineers who are expert in structural inspection are placing letters in occupants' mailboxes, a sort of proposal whose message is, 'Let's sue, and we will share the money.'

Natan Hilo, director of the planning and engineering department in the Ministry of Housing, also serves as the contractors' registrar. I asked him for explanations for the inspection oversights in the framework of the accelerated construction.

[Hilo] The Ministry of Housing took about 20 external inspectors and a number of engineers. The two elements examined the structures, and, only afterward did we approve the incentives, and, based on that examination, we purchased the apartments in accordance with the purchase agreement. It is difficult for me to refute your claims of severe construction defects; I am aware of the problem.

[HA'ARETZ] And what is your explanation for its existence?

[Hilo] It could be that the inspection before giving the incentives was defective. We will have to go to the sites in which there were defects, and the contractor will have to pay for it. There are contractors to whom we owe money, and then we have the possibility of foreclosing the pledges that these contractors have with us.

[HA'ARETZ] Are we speaking of contractors that, essentially, are not professionals?

[Hilo] To my great regret, there are meteoric contractors that landed over here in the same period. With them there will be a problem; they, apparently, will go back to selling vegetables in the market.

[HA'ARETZ] Are you referring to contractors who are politically connected?

[Hilo] Permit me not to relate to that. There are things that I erase from memory. The Ministry's administration and Minister of Housing Sharon turned to me, with the start of the jump in the scope of construction, and demanded that there be an opening in the club for housing companies, that there would only be individual ones. Then, they began to talk about a much lower entry threshold, and then came the section on the quality of the contractor. This also depends on the work of Arabs from the territories. I pray that the blockade will continue, and then construction will advance by giant leaps.

Minister of Housing Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer refuses to place the blame on the Arabs: "This is a reality that was forced on me, in the placement of the sites, as well as the



placement of construction and the type. There was no connection between the various components that create the readiness of a Jew to live in a certain place. There, in Ofaqim, I have 2,500 empty housing units. Why did they suddenly build there, in a place where the unemployment rate is one of the highest in the country? Who would be willing to live there?

[HA'ARETZ]: And what about the construction defects in the apartments that were sold?

[Ben-Eli'ezer]: I know about that. One of the contractors told me explicitly that he would not live in a creation that he built. There are contractors who did awe-inspiring work, but there are those who took advantage of this reality and built on that scale."

#### Dutch 'Afula

In 'Afula, 2,200 housing units were built. Five hundred of them were sold by the contractors themselves, and another 500 were sold by the Ministry of Housing through the Shikun Vepitu'ah corporation. One thousand, two hundred housing units remain empty. Among the builders there was Mordekhai Shechter, Ltd., which built 500 housing units and received 14.5 million shekels in construction incentives.

Three hundred ninety two housing units built by the company are ground-attached units and were built in 'Afula 'Elit. In January 1991, the company advertised these apartments in conspicuous ads. "Do you want to live in Holland? Come to the villas of 'Afula Hatzi'ira." Purchasers were promised a Dutch-style [MADREHOV], a view of the Yizra'el Valley, a foundation, environmental development, and quality of life [sentence as published]. The apartments referred to have three to four rooms, with the possibility of second-story construction, and they were offered at a price of \$70,000 to \$77,000.

In June 1991, the company again published announcements heralding the fact that "309 military and police officers, engineers, teachers, accountants, clerks, technicians, doctors, and former kibbutz members" have already purchased apartments in 'Afula Hatzi'ira. Young couples who came to the site were impressed by the plans and the view and joined the apartment purchasers on the spot.

In the announcements it was not written that the apartments were built very quickly and it is doubtful whether handing over this information would have restrained the buyers. "I bought the home when there was a wheat field here," Shitrit told me this week on the patio of the apartment, which looks down upon the Valley. "I said to myself that if 50 percent of the contractor's promises were realized, we would be in good shape. When the meaning of accelerated construction became clear to me, it was already too late. When I entered the apartment, I was astounded to discover severe defects, such as crooked walls, lengths of tiles that were put together sloppily, one here, one there, sunken floors."

Dozens of Shitrit's neighbors discovered similar defects in their homes, some of them unimaginable. For example, in the company's brochures, directions were included for the use and maintenance of the gutters, but the occupants discovered that there were no gutters at all in their apartments. They further discovered that the foyer walls were made of plaster slabs, which necessitated mounting iron gates to prevent break-ins. In addition to surprises in the apartments themselves, defects were also discovered in the environmental base. The sidewalks alongside the apartments are made of interlocking stones, the majority of which are sunken and the other part came apart a short time after moving into the apartment. The rocks placed alongside of the gardens did not succeed in curbing ground erosion in the winter, and holes formed in ground adjacent to the building.

After the surprises multiplied, the occupants turned to Professor Elisha' Tetza, of the architecture faculty at the Tekhnion, a structural engineering expert and consultant. Professor Tetza was asked to examine the apartments and prepare an opinion for the purpose of submitting a lawsuit. In the examination conducted by the professor in June 1992 of Yosi Shitrit's apartment, he reached the conclusion that they were speaking of repairs totaling 63,000 shekels: Crumbling of the plaster walls in the apartment entrance and replacing them with concrete walls; replacing the flooring in the entire apartment; tile repairs; stabilization of frame heads; pouring window sills; protection for the gas tubing; repairs to the roof; fixing the retaining wall at the entry to the apartment area. Prof. Tetza submitted similar opinions for additional occupants in the neighborhood.

Prof. Tetza pins most of the criticism on the Ministry of Housing: "The Ministry did not control the entire construction process, and it is not important what the reason is, be it from lack of manpower or lack of professionalism. In actuality, there were no inspectors on behalf of the Ministry. It could be that the inspector's name was written down, but he did inspect."

[HA'ARETZ] But now, will the contractors be sued for repairs and will they pay?

[Tetza] I anticipate a wave of suits in the coming year or two, but, in my opinion, the contractors will not be able to withstand the cost of repairs. Therefore, serious contests are anticipated here.

[HA'ARETZ] And what is the solution?

[Tetza] The solution can only be toward buildings that will be constructed here in the future. A serious examination arrangement must be set up over contractor work. A institutionalized construction cruiser, as in Europe, especially in Germany [sentence as published]. There, defects such as those revealed to my eyes in the past months, would not be found.

[HA'ARETZ] And now, are consultants of structural examination also celebrating?

[Tetza] To my great regret, now there are construction experts who do more harm than good and sometimes present unjustified opinions that bring about unjustified suits. This is all the result of the situation of awarding a prize for the acceleration of construction.

Last week, I went with Prof. Tetza on a tour of a few construction sites in northern Israel: We were in 'Afula, Nesher, and Migdal Ha'emeq. In the Peninat Ha'emeq neighborhood, in Migdal Ha'emeq, many occupants complained about the condition of the apartments that they purchased. In contractor Moshe Hadif's and contractor Yosi Bleicher's projects, defects were discovered that will require an investment of tens of thousands of shekels per apartment. Shim'on Mor-Yosef, of 8 Tzipori Street, apartment 1, purchased a 99-meter-square apartment for \$100,000. Immediately after moving in, in September 1991, he began to discover defects. One of Mor-Yosef's masochistic hobbies, his neighbors attest, is to knock on the walls to hear the echo of the hollow spaces inside. One day, knocking was not enough for him; he drilled into one of the external walls and discovered grains of calcium carbonate mixed in with the concrete. Many of the floors in Mor-Yosef's home have already sunk, as well as the tiled floor in the shower. It is impossible to fully open the bathroom window because of a protrusion in the bricks adjoining the window. Moisture in the walls was already discovered in the first winter.

We heard similar songs in every apartment that we visited. "I invested the better part of my money to purchase a good apartment in a good location, but the contractor took our money from us and ruined our health," says Yitzhaq Kohen, Mor-Yosef's neighbor from the upper floor. Kohen paid \$110,000, and he found cracks in the walls, moisture under the window frames, height differences on the tiled floors, plastering problems, rust in the bathtub. He cannot use the laundry patio, because the distance from the clothesline is too great. It is also impossible to enjoy the shower adjacent to the bedroom, because the floor was built in such a way that the water does not flow to the drain. In one of the apartments in an adjacent building, built by contractor Moshe Hadif, bubbles in the plaster were discovered, which demonstrates that the lime that was used in the preparation of the plaster had not cured.

In the territory of Nesher's local council, 1,780 housing units were built, and the contractors received the land at a 70-percent discount. In the Ramot Yitzhaq neighborhood in Nesher, the largest contractor was Sharviv, which built more than 500 housing units. In actuality, a Yugoslavian company, Dom, executed the construction for them, using the prefabricated method. The Yugoslavian company poured construction elements on site and, despite the fact that according to the contract with the government there was a requirement for the elements to be inspected and to bear the stamp of the Institute of Standards, nothing was done. In this instance, the Ministry of Housing refuses to hand over the incentives for meeting the timetable and also refuses to purchase from

Sharviv the apartments that they did not succeed in selling. A few weeks ago, company director Yitzhaq Regev denied to me that Sharviv has a problem with the Ministry of Housing, and claimed that the company is selling directly to the public. It was made known this week that Sharviv went to judicial law to obligate the Ministry to give them the incentives and to buy the apartments from them.

On the tour that was conducted in the buildings built by Sharviv, significant construction defects were discovered: On the storage floor, the hallway is narrow, and, in the apartments on Alon Street the hallways are also 10 percent narrower than required by the standards. A light tap on the marble in the stairwells creates an echo attesting to voids in the wall; cracks appeared in the external walls, and, in one of the apartments, the walls are crooked. The external plaster is thin and the plaster inside the apartments is not insulated as it should be.

Moshe Tzur, of 2 Alon Street, paid \$102,000 for a 110-meter-square apartment. He received strange flooring in nonuniform colors, broken mosaic tiles on the windowsills and the patio. Professor Tetza explicitly states that the price paid by Tzur was too high: "I am afraid that, based on these defected, the price was inflated. It is clear to me that the construction company's investment did not cost more than half of the price paid by the occupant."

The accelerated construction method was apparently intended to absorb immigrants as a quick solution to the housing distress, but, in the apartments of the project, itself, only 20 percent of the buyers are new immigrants. Attorney Reuven Shami, of Jerusalem, who represents 30 occupants in a suit against contractor Mordekhai Shechter in the 'Afula Hatzira project, talks about the advertisement and the reality: "The ads made the occupants think that they were moving into the home of their dreams, but, in actuality, they received apartments that are not suitable for human dwellings. In the ads, they spoke of an expensive project, but concealed from the occupants that a large part of the project would be sold to the Ministry of Housing as housing for immigrants and evacuees."

#### An Adjoining Stench

In Ashqelon, 5,000 housing units were built, the number of contractors who built there was high, as is the number of occupants complaining about numerous construction defects. In addition to complaints against the contractors, the occupants have complaints against the Ministry of Housing, which did not complete the environmental development. People were forced to move into apartments that were not connected to the sewage, electricity, and water networks, and received electricity from a contractor's generator and water from his pipes that were installed for the purpose of the construction, itself.

In March 1992, Eti and Qobi Levi purchased an apartment from contractor Y.A. Harben, in the Neve Deqalim neighborhood in northern Ashqelon. For 77 square



meters, they paid \$72,000, and they received the key four months ago. They discovered that the mosaic on the patio was broken, the tiled floors were broken, and there were differences in height among them. Later cracks in the walls appeared. The window-frame caulking at the connection to the wall was done with silicone, and, in a number of places in the apartment, signs of moisture and mold appeared. Eti Levi: "I turned to the contractor a number of times for him to repair the defects, but no one helped me. He received the money and the incentives and does not give two hoots about us."

Two weeks ago, the magistrate's court in Ashdod ruled that the construction firm Ahim Yisra'el, Ltd. will pay Albert Azri'el the sum of 80,000 shekels for severe defects that were discovered in his apartment of Portzey Haderekh Street in the Y quarter of the city. He purchased the apartment in May 1991 and received it only on 29 November, four months after the end of the delivery time according to the contract. The apartment was not connected to the electricity network, but the contractor connected it to a generator for two months until its connection to the national network. Electricity was cut off more than once, because of a failure or solar deficiency.

Many more defects were discovered, and Azri'el turned to a structural examination engineer, who prepared an opinion of repairs totaling 80,000 shekels. With this opinion, attorney David Avital represented him in the magistrate's court. The Ahim Yisra'el company did not offer a defense, and the judge determined that they must pay the apartment owner full damages.

Attorney Avital: "The very fact that the Ministry of Housing gave monetary incentives to the construction companies caused a decline in quality and in the nature of the materials that they supplied. Companies which, until then had built in a relatively good manner, were concerned only with being quick, in order to enjoy the incentives. There is no doubt that the Ministry of Housing is also guilty in the lack of inspection."

In Ashdod, more housing units were built than in any other place in the country, 8,000 in the past three years; many contractors earned high incentives and most significant discounts in land purchase. Even Kibbutz Ha'artzi's construction company was among those that built hundreds of housing units there and received millions of shekels in building incentives. In one of the buildings that they built, mosaic lengths that decorated the building fell off one after another, and the occupants demanded that all of the mosaic lengths be taken down and new ones be assembled in their place.

On one of the trips by Housing and Development representatives, in Upper Nazareth, for purposes of receiving 162 apartments of Malibu Yisra'el, Ltd., in accordance with the purchase agreement with the Ministry of Housing, a strange picture was discovered by the company's representatives: Seven housing units were built adjacent to the municipal dump, and the stench that prevailed there made it obvious that there was no chance of selling these apartments. Udi Lavi, assistant director general of Housing and Development, told me that the company refused to accept the apartments: "I do not understand how the Ministry of Housing permitted the construction of buildings in such a place. This only proves that there was no inspection before and during construction, otherwise they would have stopped it. The contractor simply built according to the Ministry's program, but hundreds of thousands of shekels were lost to the government treasury." Lavi also related that, in Giv'at 'Ada, the company refused to accept apartments purchased by the Ministry of Housing, as well as in Ma'alot. In this case, we are speaking of defective apartments built by contractor Uri Dori, one of the largest in the country. Dori's company built 2,800 apartments throughout the country, within the framework of accelerated construction, and received 68 million shekels in incentives for them.

Lavi turns his criticism to the Ministry of Housing's inspectors and insists on pointing out that he is referring to "Ariq Sharon's" inspectors. "Where were all of the inspectors and district manager that Ariq Sharon appointed? They did not check the quality and did not sit on the contractors' tails; who determined the criteria for the division of booty; why did one contractor succeed in receiving a bigger piece of pie than another?"

In Ofaqim, 2,800 housing units were built; to date, the contractors succeeded in selling on 40 of them, and the Ministry of Housing purchased 1,000. In Nitivot, 1,800 units were built; to date, only 200 have been sold and the state purchased 550. In Qiryat Gat, 4,200 apartments were built, 1,500 were sold, and the Ministry of Housing purchased another 1,800. In Beersheba, 9,600 housing units were built; of them, 3,000 were sold to the public and another 2,500 to the state.

The government's Housing and Development company receives most of the apartments that the government purchases, and it will deal with their sale. All elements with whom I have spoken estimate that this process will last for years. The Ministry of Housing has spent about 9 billion shekels on the acquisition of apartments, and a large part of the sum was spent on the construction of neighborhoods in places like Nitivot, Shederot, Ofaqim, and Yeruham. These neighborhoods are now referred to as "phantom neighborhoods" in the Ministry, and they remind us that guarding the structures alone will cost the state millions of shekels per year.

## Document: Who Received What

Company*	Settlement	Incentive Total (Shekels)
A. Dori, Corporation for Engineering Projects	Migdal Ha'emeq, Nazareth, Karmi'el, Nesher, Qiryat Bi'aliq, Eilat	68,123,000
A. Levi, Building Contractors, Ltd.	Nesher, Nahariya, Tirat HaKarmel, Yavne	14,206,000
Sherbet Brothers, Construction Company, Ltd.	'Afula	12,684,000
Ashdar, Ltd.	Eilat, Karmi'el, Ri'shon Letzion, Yavne, Beersheba, Jerusalem, and more	52,898,000
Ashtrom, Engineering Company, Ltd.	Qiryat Shemona	8,352,000
BST, Construction Company, Ltd.	Tiberius	8,060,000
Ben-Yaqar Gat	Beersheba, Ro'sh Ha'ayin, Yavneh, Ri'shon Letzion, Ashqelon	26,685,000
Construction and Development, Yifrah Avraham	Karmi'el, Migdal Ha'emeq, Akko, and more	8,787,000
N Shaqed Apartments, Ltd.	Hedera	8,508,000
Mario Lezniq Construction Company	Nazareth, Lod, Ramleh, Eilat, and more	39,903,000
Y Moskowitz, Construction Company	Karmi'el, Yoqne'am, Pardes Hana, Hedera	14,268,000
M.B., Construction Consortium of Hakibbutz Ha'artzi	Nazareth, Ashdod, Beersheba	17,134,000
Mivne Rav-Dirot (1990)	Nesher, Jerusalem, Qiryat Gat, Ashqelon	14,348,000
Mivney Gazit (2000), Ltd.	Pardes Hana, Hedera, Ofaqim	21,444,000
Muhammad 'Abd al-Qadr and Partners	Karmi'el, Nazareth, Hazor Hagalilit	7,596,000
Mr. 'Arad, Construction and Development Company, Ltd.	Beersheba, 'Arad, Qiryat Gat	15,757,000
Malibu Yisra'el, Ltd.	Safed, Karmi'el, Qiryat Gat	26,543,000
Mordekhai Shechter, Ltd.	'Afula	14,487,000
Qasdor Yisra'el	Shederot	19,774
Remet, Ltd.	Ri'shon Letzion, Beersheba, Jerusalem	11,079,000
Shechtman and Partners, Construction and Development Company	'Afula, Qiryat Yam	7,146,000
TASHLUZ Investments, Ltd.	Hedera, Dimona	16,451,000

\* Only companies at the top of the incentives ladder were included in the table.

### Palestinian Police Force as Friend, Not Foe

93AA0053A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Apr 93 p B1

[Article by Z. Shif: "Palestinian Police Are Not a Threat"]

[Text] "The possibility that Palestinian police, whose members will be armed, will be established in the territories, agitated a number of the leaders of the Jewish settlers. A few of them were quick to threaten that they would shoot any armed Palestinian, for, in their eyes, he is, in reality, a terrorist. If blood is spilled, they said, it will be the responsibility of Yitzhaq Rabin, who intends to permit the establishment of Palestinian police.

### They are Opposed to Autonomy

However, for the Jewish settlers, the problem is not the existence of Palestinian police in the territories, but, first of all, the possibility that autonomy will be organized there. They do not want the Palestinians to even be

responsible for sewage matters in the territories, lest, as one of the settlers stated, they intentionally make their waste flow toward the settlements to make the lives of the Jews tiresome. They do not want it, because the Palestinians will have the authority to give out construction permits, and perhaps the Palestinians will put up houses adjacent to the fences of the Jewish settlements. Nor do they want a Palestinian policeman to write them a traffic ticket or set up a barrier to detain them on their way to work in Israel.

But, deep in their hearts, the settlers understand that it is impossible to consider Palestinian autonomy without its own police, the need for which was also discussed in the Camp David accords. On this matter, in my opinion, the Jewish settlers are fighting a losing battle. On this matter, it is possible to view the blockade imposed upon the territories as a landmark for the general trend; through this, Israel essentially determined the borderline of the Palestinian autonomy. The irony of the matter is that Israel is blockading itself from the Palestinians, and the settlements and the

Jewish settlers have been left in a sort of internal siege. The Israeli public supports the blockade despite its high economic cost, and this is proof that the majority in Israel view the problem in the territories as a security matter, and not an ideological one. In the eyes of the majority of the public, at issue is a security problem within the Green Line areas and not in the settlements: The security of the settlements and their inhabitants is perceived as secondary.

Israel is interested in peace prevailing in the autonomy that is established. Their security interest is that this region remain quiet even if we withdraw from the Gaza Strip. They want whoever accepts the administration of Palestinian autonomy to have control over law and order, and that it have an avenue for complaints and for assigning responsibility. Israel has a security interest in having Palestinian autonomy authority cooperate with them in the war against terrorism and act to prevent people from Hamas, Jabril, or other pro-Iranian factors from causing a provocation whose purpose is to put an end to the accords and to rekindle the conflict.

For this reason, a Palestinian police force is necessary in the autonomy. They are not the ones who will defend Israel, for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will also stand in the front line, along with the other arms of defense, but we must come to peace with the fact that the IDF will not continue the conquest. It will not remain in town centers and will not be responsible, in the future, for internal order, for rule of law, and for matters between Palestinians. This will be the job of the Palestinian police, and it will be their responsibility to cooperate with the Israeli police and Jordanian security elements. Thus, a new page will be opened, and it is better that we start thinking in new terms.

Nevertheless, we must make it clear to the Palestinians, already in this phase, that they must not delude themselves that, by means of Palestinian police, they will be able to evade the demilitarization of the territories in the future. The demilitarization, with all of its components, is the basis for any agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. This refers to a strong police that will be able to maintain law and order and contend with radicals of all sorts, but not to the establishment of a Palestinian army in police uniforms. This refers to a police force that deals with internal security, and not to a body armed like an army. The Palestinian army will also not be a corridor for stationing units, even small ones, of other Arab forces in the territories.

In order to clarify these details, we must speak with the Palestinians, and not only with the local ones. This must be done directly, not by means of interviews in the newspapers. To date, they have not discussed the subject with them, and everything has been done indirectly. The Palestinians very much want to conduct a dialogue with Israel on security issues, but they have a psychological problem: It appears to them, mistakenly, that talk of cooperation with the Israeli security forces is the same as collaborating with the conquest. The PLO mainstream

fears that the matter will anger the extremists among them, as well as other organizations.

#### Only a Few Are Skilled

Another difficulty results from the fact that, actually, only a few Palestinians are skilled in security matters. In contrast to other areas, only a small number of them deal with security questions, and even those have not succeeded in departing from the theoretical realm. Nevertheless, a few names spring to mind; there is one who is concentrating, on behalf of the PLO, within the framework of preparation for negotiation, on the security issues, and the Palestinian negotiating delegation has advisors who are also delving into security issues. Thus, a new address is being created, with which the matter of the Palestinian police and other, broader security issues will be clarified.

#### No Change Expected in Banking Control of Market

93AA0053B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Apr 93  
p B1

[Article by N. Shtarseler: "Longings for the Bayski Report"]

[Text] The more days that pass and the more the criticism against the Minister of the Treasury grows in connection to the banking system, the more I find myself missing the Bayski Report. This was the only time that five people sat down and fundamentally studied the subject for one year and four months. No other group has devoted so much time to a subject. No other group worked with such legal elementariness. No other group of people has the knowledge and the experience and the straight intellect of the five members of the Bayski committee: Dr. Moshe Bayski, then a judge in the supreme court, now resigned; Vladimir Zayler, then a district court judge in Jerusalem, now president of the district court; Professor Ze'ev Hirsch and Professor Dani'el Friedman of Tel Aviv University; and Professor Marshall Sarnat of Hebrew University.

On page 363 of the report, the five wrote as follows: "Banks shall be forbidden, directly or indirectly, to be managers of trust funds [QEREN] that deal fully or partially in stocks and, thus, they shall be forbidden to be managers of provident funds [QUPA]. For this purpose, a sufficient transition period shall be set to enable organizing for the sake of the execution of this recommendation. It is appropriate for the managers of the capital funds and the provident funds be bodies that are completely independent of banks."

This unambiguous conclusion is the result of the use made of public money deposited in trust funds and provident funds to execute the manipulative control of the October 1983 collapse. The committee describes, in

chapter 10 of the report, the use that the bank management made of this money, for the benefit of the interests of the management and the bank, and against the interests of the customers.

Now the banks are claiming that 10 years have passed since the collapse, and why look back, we must look forward. Management has changed, the lesson has been learned, and it is now clear that the managers of the funds and the funds and the advisers are reflecting only the customers' interests and not that of the bank. Is this so?

Let us examine the subject of advice. The Bayski committee proved that the entire advisory mechanism was at the service of banking management—and not for the customer's benefit. As a result, the QEREN funds and the QUPA funds retained a most notable percentage of bank stock of the bank to which they belonged. Then, too, the banks said, in their testimony before the committee, the QEREN funds and QUPA funds protected only the interest of the customer, but the committee was not too impressed by this testimony. The numbers prove all: Out of all assets of the provident funds, 60 percent were bank stocks, and, of them, 96 percent were of the bank to which the funds belonged.

And today? Each of us is going through a similar experience. You go into a bank branch and ask them to advise you what to do with your money. And what happens? The adviser always recommends investing in the trust funds or provident funds belonging to the bank. The Bank Le'umi adviser recommends Bank Le'umi funds and the Bank Hapo'alim adviser recommends Bank Hapo'alim funds. How can this be? For one of the two is mocking us, or they are continuing the work that was never stopped—giving advice in the bank's interest, not the customer's interest. For if it is not so, it is impossible to understand why no adviser would ever once recommend investing in the trust funds of another bank or of a private broker, even though some of them yield much higher gains.

Here, too, the numbers prove all. The advice results in 90 percent of the customers purchasing trust funds and provident funds of the same bank that gave them advice. And why does the number not reach 100 percent? Because there are stubborn people who come to the bank branch with a firm opinion and force the adviser to purchase another trust fund for them. They do not like them at the bank. From here it is derived that the recommendation of the Bayski committee, to exclude banks from managing trust funds and provident funds, must be confirmed.

In contrast, Avraham Shohet and Ya'akov Frankel recommend building a "Chinese wall" between the bank and the provident funds, by appointing external members to the fund's investment committee and by imposing limitations on the fund manager, such as a cooling period. In the Bank of Israel, this is seen as an achievement, but another look reveals that, in essence,

nothing will change. The external members who are chosen will decide, perhaps, on general lines for investment policies, but the one who, in actuality, will determine what to buy is the manager, and he will always be from the bank, with a cooling period or without it. Therefore, the conflicts of interest will remain. In addition, no changes in trust funds or advising will occur. Therefore the absolute control of the banks in the Israeli capital market will also continue after accepting the recommendations of Shohet and Frankel.

Even on the subject of the nonbanking holdings of banks, essentially no significant change will occur, as long as they can continue to control the existing giant corporations, such as Kelal, Deleq, Ampal, and Africa Yisra'el. It is true that the banks will be compelled to sell part of their existing holdings, but, with the money that they receive, they will continue to acquire other companies, in all branches of the economy, and thus, they will expand their hold on the Israeli economy and their influence over it. The limitation of acquiring up to 25 percent of a specific company's capital is not effective. With the help of this percentage, it is possible to control large and important companies, when the remainder of the shares are dispersed among the vast public.

Even the recommendation to separate two or three small banks from the three large banks is no more than a delusion. This will not bring about a significant change in the level of centralization and power of Bank Hapo'alim and Bank Le'umi in the economy and in banking. Even after this symbolic change, the assets of Bank Hapo'alim will be 60 percent of Israel's gross national product, while in the United States, the assets of the largest bank, Citicorp, are only 4 percent of the national product. But the Bank of Israel will not be brave enough to speak of a true decentralization of the two big banks.

This American example brings us to the path that the American authorities took when the banking system and the stock market fell in the 1929 collapse. They immediately appointed a committee of experts, which recommended removing control over the capital market from the banks. A very similar recommendation to the Bayski committee's recommendations, but, unlike us, they also carried out the recommendations. In 1934, comprehensive legislative work was put into effect, separating American banking into two—commercial banks and investment banks. Only now, after 60 years of separation, are the Americans starting to discuss the possibility of deregulation—after all of them learned the lesson very, very well.

## MOROCCO

### Ties to Portugal Reviewed; Trade Figures

93AF0582D Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 7 May 93 p 20

[Article by Laila Jalal: "Diversification of Economic Relations"]



[Text] With the purpose of strengthening economic relations between Morocco and Portugal, the Portuguese minister of state for foreign trade will make an official visit to Rabat in June. At that time, he will announce a 200-million-dollar credit to expand Portugal's exports to Morocco.

Since 1990 when President Mario Soares traveled to Morocco for a state visit, economic relations between the two countries have taken a new direction.

Economic officials are in the process of defining a new strategy of cooperation that in the medium term will enable business operators to take better advantage of the possibilities for joint ventures and establish the basis for relationships that will be advantageous to both parties. Economic relations between Morocco and Portugal have ceased to be limited to trade. The creation of jointly owned companies in a range of fields is an indication that cooperation between Morocco and Portugal has moved beyond the traditional framework that had long been characteristic of it.

The new trend is being helped along by the economic policies of both countries that work in favor of that objective. Specifically, Morocco has adopted a policy of economic liberalization and the promotion of foreign investment.

Portugal, which joined the European Economic Community in 1986, is in a transitional phase during which the Portuguese are taking great interest in the restructuring of their production capacity in the effort to bring it into line with European norms.

The restructurings are causing industries to look to neighboring countries for new locations. Morocco is promoting its many advantages as a candidate, hoping to attract some of the businesses that are seeking new locations. In that context, the two countries have organized a large number of exchanges between delegations of businessmen. The first contacts led to an expansion in subcontracting and joint investment.

#### Starting in 1990

Several jointly owned companies have been created in the areas of fishing, civil engineering, the garment industry, and food processing.

An in-depth analysis of trends in trade between the two countries shows that in 1990 Portugal began to diversify its imports from Morocco. For Morocco, this meant that new products were added to the list of its traditional exports to Portugal. They included citrus and other fruit, clothing, and flowers.

In 1992, however, a decline can be seen in the volume of certain exports to Portugal, among them phosphates and lead, which decreased by 45 percent and 30 percent, respectively, between 1991 and 1992.

That decline is largely explained by the drought that occurred in Portugal and its effects on the farming sector, the primary user of Moroccan fertilizers.

The dwindling volume of trade in these two products also contributed to a widening of the gap between Morocco's exports to Portugal and Portugal's exports to Morocco. To be specific, Morocco spent 48.5 million dollars on Portuguese imports in 1992 as compared with 43 million the previous year. And the Portuguese spent far less on Moroccan imports: 25 million dollars in 1992 as compared with 39.5 million in 1991. The main reason is that Portugal bought fewer quantities of phosphates and lead from Morocco.

At the same time, however, Portugal began to import new products from Morocco. Between 1991 and 1992, imports of fruit rose by 25 percent, cork by 18 percent, and garments by 12 percent. A total of about 2.5 million dollars was spent on these three products. Nevertheless, phosphates continued to rank first among Portugal's imports from Morocco, representing 6.5 million dollars in 1992.

#### Tourism Up in First Trimester Report

93AF0582C Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 7 May 93 p 10

[Text] The official statistics from the Ministry of Tourism confirm that the tourism sector was on the rebound during the first quarter of 1993. Among the major European countries of origin, there was a net increase of 9.3 percent over the same period last year. But the most important indicator is the increased number of French tourists (6.8 percent).

The tourism industry has good reason to be optimistic, given the number of European tourists traveling to Morocco during the first quarter of 1993, as recorded at the country's points of entry. The numbers for this period are slightly higher than in 1990, considered a benchmark year by the professionals: 249,388 European tourists in 1993 as compared with 248,658 in 1990.

#### The Recovery Was Expected

Of that total, French tourists lead the rest, numbering 78,966 as compared with 73,943 during the same period of 1992. That is a 6.8-percent increase, and it is especially comforting as the figures for France had been declining for several years.

But it should also be noted that the 1993 figure falls short of the 1990 level when 94,317 French tourists traveled to Morocco.

The professionals interpret these figures as a clear sign of a marked recovery in this portion of the European market. Several factors are viewed as favorable to a recovery. First, Morocco holds a competitive position as a tourist destination in intermediate-range travel. Second, this particular clientele is expected to show

renewed interest in Morocco thanks to an all-out publicity campaign that was conducted in the five main European markets (France, Germany, Spain, Great Britain, and Italy). In numbers, Spanish tourists rank second to the French as 45,413 visited Morocco during the first quarter of 1993, as compared with 40,521 during the same period in 1992. The Spanish market showed a significant increase over 1992 (11.8 percent), and compared favorably with 1990 (33,024 tourists).

In the German market, the recovery already under way last year with 34,717 tourists was confirmed during the early part of this year with the arrival of 45,152 tourists, an increase of 30 percent.

As for the British, already surpassed by the Italians in 1992, a perceptible increase is to be noted (3.1 percent). British tourists numbered 18,618 in the first quarter of 1993 as compared with 18,057 in 1992.

While the results for these origins were positive, the figures for the various Nordic countries did not move upward, except in the case of Sweden (an increase of 3.2 percent).

Moreover, the figures for Finland dropped sharply: While more than 7,000 Finnish tourists traveled to Morocco in 1992, only 3,500 did so in the first quarter of 1993—a decrease of 50 percent!

#### North American Tourists Visiting in Larger Numbers

For the North American market as well, the figures indicate a recovery: 17,120 American tourists (as compared with 16,174) and 4,257 Canadian tourists (as compared with 3,728).

But the most notable decline is among North African tourists. Arrivals from North African countries decreased by 38.4 percent over the same period last year. Not surprisingly, that decline occurred largely in the figures for Algeria, previously the country of origin for the largest number of tourists and travelers in transit. The number of Algerians crossing the border into Morocco at the various points of entry decreased from 488,346 during the first quart of 1992 to only 297,880 in 1993—a drop of 39 percent.

The ebb in the number of Algerian tourists is partly due to the higher price of "across-the-border" insurance since the Algerian Insurance Company (SSA) withdrew from the convention it had signed with the Moroccans. Another factor is the lower value of the dinar in relation to the dirham.

The dwindling number of Algerian tourists has sent the total for tourists of all origins down by 22.3 percent (from 777,241 in 1992 to 603,910 in 1993, and there are 190,000 fewer Algerian tourists this year).

Declines are reported for the following origins:

- Libya (48.8 percent)
- Tunisia (10.8 percent)
- Iraq (19.1 percent)
- Senegal (32.7 percent)
- USSR (76.4 percent)

The trends by region are as follows:

- Europe: +9.7 percent
- North Africa: -38.4 percent
- The Arab world: +7.1 percent
- The Americas: +7.8 percent
- Africa: -21.6 percent
- Various countries: -14.6 percent
- All origins combined: -22.3 percent

Yearly Tourist Arrivals at Entry Points  
(as of first quarter 1993)

Region and Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	% change since 1992
Europe	248,658	93,415	228,029	249,328	+9.3
France	94,317	28,879	73,943	78,966	+6.8
Spain	33,024	23,197	40,621	45,413	+11.8
Germany	34,096	12,102	34,717	45,152	+30.0
England	17,692	5,235	18,057	18,618	+3.1
Italy	15,509	4,988	18,935	19,734	+4.2
Holland	6,325	2,239	4,911	4,853	-1.1
Belgium	5,881	2,039	5,356	7,327	+36.8
Switzerland	5,773	2,436	5,460	5,583	+2.2
Portugal	2,088	783	2,513	2,464	-2.0
Austria	2,986	894	3,629	3,977	+9.6
Denmark	8,361	1,803	3,657	3,627	-0.8
Sweden	4,569	1,202	3,440	3,553	+3.2
Norway	2,082	597	1,847	1,837	-0.5
Finland	12,166	3,906	7,230	3,548	-50.9



**Yearly Tourist Arrivals at Entry Points  
(as of first quarter 1993) (Continued)**

Region and Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	% change since 1992
Others	3,789	2,111	3,713	4,735	+27.5
North Africa	318,216	609,242	506,409	311,909	-38.4
Algeria	296,272	585,051	488,346	297,880	-39.0
Tunisia	14,494	11,945	10,777	9,614	-10.8
Libya	6,529	11,414	6,092	3,120	-48.8
Mauritania	921	832	1,194	1,295	+8.4
Other Arab Countries	10,613	2,823	6,596	7,070	+7.1
Saudi Arabia	5,457	1,124	3,673	4,146	+12.8
Kuwait	461	104	303	419	+38.3
Egypt	1,030	313	575	596	+3.6
Iraq	955	126	209	169	-19.1
United Arab Emirates	312	98	215	197	-8.4
Jordan	726	233	487	630	+29.3
Others	1,682	825	1,134	913	-19.5
Americas	21,996	5,841	21,608	23,289	+7.8
USA	15,344	3,325	16,174	17,120	+5.8
Canada	4,480	1,638	3,728	4,257	+14.1
Brazil	1,151	555	695	677	-2.6
Mexico	253	88	252	343	+36.1
Argentina	768	235	759	892	+17.5
Africa	3,861	2,858	2,990	2,345	-21.6
Senegal	1,728	1,200	1,140	767	-32.7
Guinea	801	531	509	475	-6.7
Mali	741	528	603	271	-55.0
Others	591	599	738	832	+12.7
Other countries	8,849	5,553	11,609	9,909	-14.6
Japan	2,980	1,812	3,865	3,978	+3.0
Australia	813	474	1,045	956	-8.5
USSR	1,022	788	2,579	608	-76.4
Various	4,034	2,479	4,120	4,367	+6.0
World total	612,193	719,732	777,241	603,910	-22.3
Total excluding North Africans	293,977	110,490	270,832	292,001	+7.8

**Privatize Funds To Finance Social Programs**

93AF0582B Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 7 May 93 p 8

[Article by Mouna El Banna and Jean-Pierre Tuquoi: "LE MONDE Says Morocco Will Use Privatization Proceeds To Finance Social Programs"]

[Text] Having decided to privatize its state-run companies, Morocco is trying to interest foreign investors in the effort. After a tour of the major European capitals, including a stop in Paris on 26 and 27 April, Morocco's

minister of commerce, industry, and privatization, Moulay Zine Zahidi, is to present his program to the United States and the Persian Gulf.

Six months after a timid beginning to the privatization effort (the sale of a food-processing firm), the serious part is about to begin for Morocco's officials. By the end of 1995, 112 companies—slightly less than half of all companies in which the state has an interest—are to be pushed out of the protective embrace of the state. In privatizing these companies, which employ some 35,000, the state hopes to earn some 10 billion francs. (An ad-hoc committee tasked with

appraising the worth of these companies has not yet completed its computations.) "The proceeds will go to education, health, and public housing, except for a small portion that will be used to finance the country's infrastructure," explained the official who will oversee the program, Minister Moulay Zine Zahidi, during his visit to Paris on 26 and 27 April.

Morocco's public sector (which represents 15 percent of gross domestic product and 5 percent of the trade and industry sector) may not be as large as Algeria's, but privatizing a part of it will be no easy task. The plan has been slowed down by a combination of inexperience on the part of Moroccan officials, complex legislation, and bureaucratic red tape. So much so that aside from the sale of Sodiers, royal privatization decrees have been published for only a half-dozen midsized companies: two hotels, a garment factory employing a few hundred workers, a former dairy cooperative....

### Two Consulting Banks

Even though the country's largest cemetery will soon be added to the list, the results thus far have been mixed, to say the least. In some cases, the financial terms of the awards have been disappointing for the Moroccan government. But worst of all, many companies put on the market at the end of 1992 have yet to find a buyer.

The slowness of the process has prompted the minister of commerce, industry, and privatization to enlist the services of two consulting banks, the National Bank of Economic Development (BNDE) and Lazard Freres.

At the same time, Mr. Zahidi, accompanied by a small team of aides, has taken to the road to preach the virtues of Morocco's privatization program to an overseas audience. After Madrid and London, his pick of cities included Paris where he was at the beginning of the week. Next come Milan and Frankfurt, and in the next few weeks, he will travel to the United States and the Gulf countries.

### An Added Bonus

The labor unions and public opinion are "favorable" to the privatization plan, says Mr. Zahidi, "because no lay-offs will occur and, in certain cases, a portion of the capital will be set aside for the employees." The government hopes to get further benefit from these favorable terms. Once the current privatization program has been completed, it may wish to privatize state-run companies that enjoy a monopoly, as in the distribution of electricity. "Eventually, everything can be privatized," says Mr. Zahidi.

### Wage Freeze: Purchasing Power Further Weakened

93AF0582A Rabat L'OPINION in French  
10 May 93 pp 1,4

[Article by Mohamed Touala: "A Painful Reality"]

[Text] Despite rising prices on almost all basic goods, the minister of employment announced on May Day that the

wage freeze would remain in effect. It does not require much thought to understand the strain this may place on many salaried employees and their dependents.

For the unemployed or anyone else without a steady income, the ever-growing difficulty of keeping pace with the cost of living has become a nightmare.

While there has been no lack of talk about the continual slide in the purchasing power of broad segments of the population, it surprises many that the only response from the decisionmakers has been additional price increases. And there seems to be no end to it.

The latest increases in water and electricity rates coincided, as if by chance, with a wave of protests in various sectors of the economy. Yet it could not be more clear that these protests were aimed at drawing the attention of officials to the worsening material conditions and morale of workers, civil servants, and employees.

And the prices of meat, vegetables, services, etc., have also risen—a stark reminder to anyone who may have forgotten that drought, underemployment, and recession are not reasons enough for the government to come to the aid of the broad masses who have been hurt by these factors. On the contrary, instead of maintaining stable prices on basic goods to lighten the burden on consumers, the response has been to decontrol prices and allow them to seek their true level. An elegant way of being difficult with the international monetary institutions while imposing a form of crushing realism that every citizen has no choice but to recognize.

This year in the rural areas, farmers experienced losses the likes of which they will have trouble making up in the short term. They who were used to producing and selling grains, vegetables, and meat are now forced to become consumers, urban style.

In other words, they will need money in order to get on their feet, and it is usually their children or relatives who shoulder the burden. But, the successive price hikes will obviously take a direct and indirect toll on this form of intrafamily support, which is so vital to our society and on the quality of life that is deteriorating for both urban and rural dwellers.

It is true that the government has a program to counter the effects of the drought, with assistance to farmers. But it is safe to say that unless prices are monitored and kept in line with our present reality, any attempt to redress the situation will be in vain.

Speaking of price monitoring, it must be stated that price anarchy is becoming the rule. There can be large disparities in the prices charged for the same product in different cities or in different districts of the same city.

All these factors contribute to the continual decline in the purchasing power of Moroccans. Their purchasing power is occulted by the government's political and economic policies.

## IRAN

### Latest Figures on Nation's Slaughterhouses Published

93LA0036D Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian 30 Mar 93 p 7

[Text] The directorate of the public relations office of the Census Bureau of Iran announced: The results of the census of the slaughterhouses of the country indicate that in 1370 [21 Mar 1991-20 Mar 1992] a total of 342,000 tons of meat was produced throughout the nation. In comparison with 1369 [21 Mar 1990-20 Mar 1991] figure of 352,000, the aforementioned figure shows a 3-percent decrease.

If we assume the total tonnage of meat in 1361 [21 Mar 1982-20 Mar 1983] as "100," the indices for 1366 [21 Mar 1987-20 Mar 1988] and 1369 [21 Mar 1990-20 Mar 1991] will be 114 and 196, respectively, which will indicate the minimum and maximum rate of meat production in the nation's slaughterhouses during the last 10 years.

In 1370, 7,891 sheep and lambs with a total weight of 154,000 tons, 2,278 goats and kids with a total weight of 31,000 tons, 1,187 cows and calves with a total weight of 44,000 tons, 55,000 buffaloes with a total weight of 9,000 tons, and 18,000 camels with a total weight of 4,000 tons have been slaughtered in the country.

The said public relations office further added: The province of Isfahan with the production of 23,300 tons of mutton (15.09 percent of the total mutton thus produced throughout the country), the province of Fars with the production of 4,900 tons of goat and kid meat (16.09 percent of the total meat thus produced), the province of Tehran with the production of 20,400 tons of beef (13.88 percent of the total beef thus produced), East Azarbaijan Province with a total production of 4,500 tons of buffalo meat (47.71 percent of the buffalo meat thus produced), the province of Khorrasan with a total production of 2,000 tons of camel meat (42.13 percent of the camel meat thus produced) each have produced the maximum meat production for the species of the stocks thus mentioned above.

In conclusion, the directorate of the public relations office of the Census Bureau of Iran added: With due consideration of the fact that total meat production by the nation's slaughterhouses would not be sufficient to meet the nation's needs, in 1370 a total amount of 59,000 tons of mutton and 63,000 tons of beef have been imported by the State Meat Company, accordingly.

### Mazandaran Agricultural Census Figures Released

[Report entitled: "Detailed Results of the 1367 (1988-89) Agricultural Census for Mazandaran Province"]

93LA0036C Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian 30 Mar 93 p 7

[Text] The spokesman for the public relations office of the Census Bureau of Iran stated: A study of the detailed

results of agricultural census of Mazandaran in 1367 [21 Mar 1988-20 Mar 1989] indicate the total agricultural land of this province to be about 915,000 hectares [ha]. From this figure, 346,000 hectares of land is cultivated by irrigation, 450,000 hectares is utilized by dry farming, 74,000 hectares is assigned to orchards, and 45,000 hectares is used for fallow farming and/or cultivation by rotation. The total number of individual productions from the aforesaid figures stands at 301,000, of which an average of 3 ha of land was used for each one.

The said spokesman went on to say: The production of rice paddies in the province of Mazandaran stands at 544,000 tons, which employs 181,000 hectares of land under cultivation with a total number of 161,000 individual outputs. The median production of rice for each hectare of land is 3,004 kg, which comprise the highest figure for this production throughout the country. Other principal products of this province consist of wheat, barley, cotton, watermelons and potatoes each with a production of 443,000 tons, 196,000 tons, 189,000 tons, 55,000 tons and 45,000 tons, respectively. From among other agricultural and orchard items the production of 37,000 tons of corn, 27,000 tons of tomatoes, 21,000 tons of clover and alfalfa, 262,000 tons of oranges, 99,000 tons of tangerines, 19,000 tons of plums, 14,000 tons of sweet oranges, 13,000 tons of apples, 10,000 tons of tea, 7,000 tons of nectarines and peaches, and 5,000 tons of pomegranates are duly significant.

The aforementioned spokesman further stated: Based on the available figures, during 1367 a total amount of 91,000 tons of phosphate fertilizer have been used for annual agricultural products and 70,000 tons of organic fertilizer and 18,000 tons of phosphate fertilizer have been employed in the orchards, accordingly. In the cultivation of wheat, comprising 94.29 percent of wheat production while utilizing 95.21 percent of land, a total production of 96.48 percent has been achieved by employing at least one type of chemical fertilizer.

In 1367, the area of land ploughed by tractor comprised 96.08 percent, which ratio had a direct relation to the increase of productive lands, namely, 16.44 percent for the low-productive areas and 85.83 percent for higher productive ones. According to the same report for the year in question the number of production plots utilizing the services of tractors, combines, and tillers stands at 166,000 [figure as published]; 101,000 and 159,000, respectively.

In conclusion, the spokesman for the public relations office of the Census Bureau of Iran added: During 1367 in 171,000 individual production outputs at least one of the five most-bred animal stocks has been raised. For instance, in a 60,000 production output of sheep and goats a total number of 2.6 million head of sheep and 357,000 head of goats were raised. Likewise, the number of cows bred in the province stands at 683,000, which comprise a total of 152,000 individual outputs. Similarly, the number of buffaloes and camels raised was

reported at 3,000 and 2,000 heads, respectively. Similarly, the production of beehives produced by modern methods stands at 75,000 with a median production/output of about 11.90 kg each; while the production of beehives through traditional method stands at about 16,000 with each individual output of 1.20 kg. Production of silkworms is reported at 13,000 cases with a total of 401 tons of cocoons, while production of edible fish stands at 387 cases with a total of 1,234 ha of fishery area assigned to the breeding process.

#### **Employment Statistics for Mashhad Released**

93LA0036B Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian 30 Mar 93 p 7

[Text] The spokesman for the public relations office of the Census Bureau of Iran stated that in the pertinent statistical report regarding the housing and population growth in 1365 [21 Mar 1986-20 Mar 1987] in Mashhad, the status of employed workers, the unemployment situation, and the status of those individuals who have been unemployed for six years on longer and are seeking employment have been duly studied.

The aforementioned spokesman added: According to the 1365 census the population of the city of Mashhad stands at 1.46 million. The number in the work force is close to 326,354, of which 24,720 are women and 301,634 are men. The rate of employment is about 90.1 percent for men and 71.8 percent for women. Similarly, the share of employment in the "industrial," "agricultural," and "service" sectors stands at about 35.5 percent, 2.7 percent, and 58.7 percent, respectively.

The said spokesman continued: Among unemployed individuals seeking employment, women comprise 22.7 percent of the total unemployed force of Mashhad who are mostly below 20 years of age. The rate of unemployment is 67.3 percent for women in the 15- to 19-year age group. Likewise, the rate of unemployment for men in a similar age group stands at about 19.7 percent. Women who are engaged in economic and other occupations in the city of Mashhad number 7.6 percent.

In conclusion, the spokesman for the public relations office of the Census Bureau of Iran stated: Based on the results of 1365 census, the median number for a typical family whose head of household is employed is considered 5.1 members, and each family occupies 3.4 rooms, accordingly. In these calculations, the highest median is considered 5.4 family members that belong to those families with the household head in a supervisory/

managerial position. Similarly, the highest median number of rooms occupied by such families is considered at 4.2 rooms, accordingly.

#### **Statistics on Bakhtaran's Manpower Resources Published**

[Report entitled: "Detailed Results of Manpower in the City of Bakhtaran"]

93LA0036A Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian 30 Mar 93 p 7

[Text] The spokesman for the public relations office of the Census Bureau of Iran stated that other statistics with regard to the housing and population growth in 1365 [21 Mar 1986-20 Mar 1987], general employment and unemployment status, and the situation of individuals who have been unemployed for six years and longer in the city of Bakhtaran have been duly studied.

A study of the detailed results of Bakhtaran's manpower also indicates that the city has a population of 561,000, of which 112,828 are employed. Of the aforementioned figure 104,540 are men and 8,288 are women. Participation of women in economic and employment activities is 7.3 percent. Similarly, the women occupy 55.6 percent and men about 81.1 percent of the total work force, respectively. Likewise, the share of the employed individuals in the "service" sector is 69 percent, that of "industry" 26 percent and "agriculture," 2 percent.

The spokesman further stated: According to the information and statistics obtained as a result of this census, the share of unemployed women seeking work outweighs that of men by as much as 21.4 percent in the city of Bakhtaran. These women are mostly in the under 20-year-old age group. The rate of unemployment for women between 15 to 19 years of age stands at 90.9 percent while this rate for men in similar age group only stands at 37.1 percent.

In conclusion, the spokesman for the public relations office of the Census Bureau of Iran said: The median number for a typical family whose head of household is employed is considered 5.1 members. Likewise, each family is considered to occupy 2.7 number of rooms on the average. In these calculations the highest median for a typical family is considered 5.7 members, which only applies to those families with a self-employed head of household. In this instance, the number of rooms occupied by such families has been considered 3.4, belonging to the group of families whose household head has a supervisory/managerial position.



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